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ABSTRACT 
 
The on-going displeasure displayed by the media and business commentators, relating to apparent 
excessive and unwarranted executive directors’ salaries, has increased since the financial turmoil 
experienced in 2008. The commentaries and reports suggest that corporate governance 
interventions are not strong enough to curb the excessive remuneration packages awarded to 
executives and specifically to Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). 
 
The purpose of the research is to examine the factors that determine and/or shape the relationship 
between the Chief Executive Officer’s (CEO’s) compensation and the wealth created for 
shareholders. The investigation further seeks to find the corporate governance elements, systems 
and processes that assist in monitoring the CEO’s remuneration and performance contract. 
 
The null hypothesis is that poor corporate governance prevails in South African listed companies 
resulting in CEO compensation not being aligned to shareholder wealth creation. 
 
The aim is to establish the effectiveness of South African listed companies’ adherence to corporate 
governance measures in addressing the principal/agent problem, commonly referred to as the 
agency problem. 
 
The research embraces a sample of the top 100 actively trading companies listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) using secondary data. 
 
The study builds on existing theories and provides knowledge from a South African perspective. 
 
 
Keywords: Agency problem, board composition, CEO compensation, corporate governance, total 
shareholder returns 
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CHAPTER 1 – Introduction 
 
1.1. Contextualising the study 
 
Interest in the topic of executive remuneration has increased significantly since the last world-wide 
economic downturn, which manifested itself in 2008. This has captured attention and garnered 
extensive media commentary, with a number of articles targeting the remuneration, bonuses and 
share options granted to Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of companies, across the globe.  
 
Some of the media headlines from the United States of America (USA) include: 
• Wall Street Journal (2009), “Executive Pay and the Financial Crisis: A Refresher Course”. 
• Business News (2009), “Study shows U.S. bank CEO pay dwarfs rest of world”. 
• New York Times (2010), “UBS Shareholders Criticize Pay”. 
• Washington Post (2014), “The pay gap between CEOs and workers is much worse than you 
realize”. 
 
Additionally, reports from the European Union (EU) and Great Britain reflected the following 
headline banners: 
• Guardian (2013), “Switzerland votes against cap on executive pay”. 
• International Business Times (2014), “Mind the Pay Gap: UK's Top Bosses Earn 131 Times 
More Than Their Employees”. 
• Independent (2015), “Excessive executive pay threatens British business, say business leaders”. 
 
The South African media have similar reports relating to executive remuneration and include the 
following headlines: 
• Moneyweb (2011), “Whitey is SA’s top earning executive – again. Total package of R627.6m 
worth every cent – Christo Wiese”. 
• Cape Times (2012), “SA shareholders slow to act on governance”. 
• Cape Times (2012a), “Tide swells against fat pay-outs for executives”. 
• Financial Mail (2013), “Executive Pay. Measuring the fat cats”. 
• Sunday Times (2013), “R76m - Mondi CEO was the best paid executive in SA”. 
 
 
 
 
 
Page | 8  
 
Most of the above headlines represent reports that suggest CEOs, globally, were overpaid and the 
Moneyweb (2011) article is an example of this. The article relates to a major South African retailer’s 
Chief Executive Officer’s 2010 compensation package of R627.6 million and the package is 
reported as consisting of the sale of shares and options exercised of R594.5 million with the balance, 
R33.1 million, being salary and bonuses. According to the report, the options were earned over a 
period of 40 years. 
 
An article in the Financial Mail (2013a) reflects the views of a director of PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PwC) who informs that anger is mounting world-wide, at the growing gap between what 
executives earn and the wages of the lowest paid workers. Further, in an annual publication on 
executives directors’ remuneration, PwC (2012) state that “coupled with discussions on economic 
and growth targets and the performance of South African companies, the topic of executive 
remuneration remained a very hot one in 2011 and 2012”.  
 
The media reports, specifically those alluding to the huge gap between general employees and 
executives and the considerable size of CEOs annual earnings, raise a concern as to how this applied 
in the South African setting, given the skewed income distribution in the country as measured by 
the Gini co-efficient (The World Bank 2013), where South Africa ranks the lowest amongst the 
emerging market countries. In support of this, Crotty and Bonorchis (2006:125) assert that the wage 
gap in South Africa widened to levels of 700 to 1 and more in 2005. 
 
A further consideration, deliberated against the background of a series of global business failures 
seemingly due to corporate governance issues, was whether the supposed abnormal growth in 
executive remuneration was in line with the value businesses created for its owners. 
 
Cheffins (2009:1), in a study investigating whether corporate governance had failed during the 2008 
stock market crash, relates that “the financial turmoil surpassed anything encountered since the 
Great Depression”. The author recounts that the United States banking sector had to be bolstered 
by government rescue schemes; that Bear Stearns, a global investment bank, was sold at a distressed 
price, Lehman Brothers went bankrupt and Goldman Sachs and J. P. Morgan Chase transformed 
into commercial banks. However, the author concludes that the failed and troubled companies’ 
governance interventions were not passive and therefore, there should be no reason for the reform 
of corporate governance arrangements. 
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An article by Business Day (2014) provides a recent South African perspective by reporting on 
African Bank (ABIL), a top 100 company, listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange being placed 
under curatorship in August 2014 and in the process destroying billions of rand in shareholder 
value. Research by Sarra (2004) provides additional cases of business failures due to alleged 
mismanagement and/or corporate governance issues which include, Macmed (1999), Leisurenet 
(2000), Regal Treasury Bank (2001) and Saambou Bank (2002). It is reported that all of the above 
SA business failures are allegedly due to poor corporate governance. 
 
1.2. Clarification of the research problem 
 
In a capitalist economic system, described by Wuite (2009) as “an economic system whereby 
participants are in business to make a profit and ownership of assets is attributable to the private 
sector”, it is assumed that the ultimate goal of a firm is to create sustainable wealth for its owners 
or shareholders. Listed companies are managed on a daily basis by executive directors who are 
normally recommended and appointed by the board of the company by way of a remuneration 
and/or nominations committee consisting of non-executive directors. Brigham and Daves (2010:4) 
refers to executive directors as managers whose primary objective should be to maximise 
shareholder wealth. The authors explain that the maximisation of shareholder wealth means 
maximising the fundamental or intrinsic price of the firm’s common share and suggest that the 
executive directors of the firm have been empowered by the shareholders to make decisions to meet 
this objective. 
 
Brigham and Daves (2010:9) state that this could create a potential conflict; in that the shareholders 
need to ensure that the directors (agents) act in the interest of the shareholders (principals) and not 
their own, at all times. In attempting to address this principal-agent problem, also referred to as the 
agency problem, remuneration packages should be designed to attempt to align the manager’s 
interest with that of the owners. 
 
A Harvard Business Review (2012) article titled “Compensation and the myth of the corporate 
superstar”, highlights the issue of big bonuses being paid to CEOs. The authors assert that it is the 
belief of the current crop of CEOs that if they were not paid their bonuses, they would simply leave 
for another firm, implying a shortage of CEOs in the market. They suggest that this supposed 
competitive market for talented executives forms the basis of the problem regarding the process 
whereby the terms of the CEO’s compensation are agreed. It is the authors belief that successful 
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CEOs not only leverage their intrinsic talents, but also their accumulation of firm-specific 
knowledge and that this particular skill set can only be developed over a long tenure with a company 
and is not necessarily replicable at other firms. 
 
They conclude that firms would be better off finding candidate CEOs from within the firm or from 
a similar industry, with whom fair pay can be negotiated, at a level lower than what would be 
suggested by peer or market comparison. Their contention being that a compensation setting 
process that is reliant on peer/market comparisons is misguided, as the notion of a superstar CEO 
has been a fixture of business life for at least two decades and resides at the heart of today’s 
executive pay controversies. 
 
Their argument in respect of superstar CEOs, is supported by Collins (2001:32) in the book “Good 
to Great”. The author states that ten of the eleven good-to-great CEOs that form part of the study, 
came from within the company and suggests that firms who employ charismatic, larger than life 
CEOs tend to implode or go backwards once the CEO departs. 
 
According to Murphy (1998), the controversy around CEO compensation is nothing new. In a 
publication titled “Executive Compensation”, Murphy (1998:1) states that “few issues in the history 
of the modern corporation have attracted the attention garnered by executive compensation in 
United States companies”. It proposes that the widespread interest in executive pay is due to the 
following factors: 
• The increase in CEO compensation, in that the median cash compensation paid to CEOs of S&P 
500 companies has more than doubled since 1970 and 1996. 
• The median total of realised compensation, including share option gains, has nearly quadrupled. 
• High CEO salaries are associated with staff layoffs, plant closings and corporate downsizing. 
• The bull market of the 1990’s created windfalls for CEOs whose pay is increasingly tied to 
company stock-price performance. 
The modern history of executive compensation research, which the author explains started in the 
early 1980’s, tied in with the emergence and general acceptance of the agency theory. The article 
claims that the separation and control in modern corporations is due to the agency problem 
suggested by Berle and Means (1932) and formalised by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
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Towers Watson (2011), a leading global professional services company, in an article titled “Getting 
executive pay right” relates that British executive pay has increased at a faster rate than pay for 
most employees reversing the trend from the Second World War to about the 1970’s which saw the 
pay of many broad employee groups increase at a faster rate than pay at executive level. They 
suggest four main reasons for this: 
• The changing role of directors. 
• Labour market developments. 
• Changing pay structures. 
• Governance interventions. 
They proclaim that this is not just a British phenomenon, but something that has happened in most 
other developed economies. 
 
Research by Bebchuk and Fried (2003) which centres on publicly traded US companies that do not 
have a controlling shareholder relates that the “optimal contracting” approach assumes that boards, 
design compensation schemes to provide managers with efficient incentives to maximise 
shareholder value, thus negating the agency problem. However, their analysis of directors’ 
incentives and circumstances suggests that directors’ behaviour is also subject to an agency problem 
which undermines the board’s ability to effectively address the agency problem in the relationship 
between executives and shareholders. Their reasoning is that independent directors wish to be re-
appointed to the board at the end of their term and typically, the recommended annual CEO’s pay 
arrangement provided by management, is normally agreed to. 
1.3. Research problem and hypothesis 
The afore- mentioned context and introduction, raises the following questions, 
• Is there an alignment between CEO compensation and the value created for shareholders? 
• What are the corporate governance interventions that monitor the actions of CEOs? 
 
If it is assumed that there are corporate governance controls that align the CEO’s (agent’s) interest 
with that of the shareholders (principals), then a theoretical model should suggest that good 
corporate governance prevails when CEOs are appointed and managed, which would result in their 
compensation contracts being designed to ensure shareholder wealth creation. A diagram 
representing the key components of this model is as follows: 
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Given the implications drawn from the above model, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H1: Corporate governance (controlling variable) ensures that CEO compensation packages are 
adequately designed to negate the agency problem. 
H2: Corporate governance (mediating variable) intercedes in the CEO’s interests and shareholder 
relationship ensuring the alignment of CEO compensation to shareholder wealth created. 
H3: The alignment of the CEO’s interests to that of the owners which ensures shareholder wealth 
creation. 
 
However, given the negative media headlines and speculation, it appears as if an opposing 
assumption prevails, thus the following null hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H0: Poor corporate governance prevails in South African listed companies resulting in CEO 
compensation not being aligned to shareholder wealth creation. 
 
The theory’s concepts are deconstructed into the following measures: 
• Corporate governance: A four point corporate governance index (CGI) of key board composition 
and ownership elements. 
• CEO compensation (CC): Components of compensation which include basic salary, short term 
bonus and fringe benefits. 
• Shareholder wealth: Total shareholder returns (TSR), which is a suggested proxy for shareholder 
wealth creation. 
 
Corporate 
Governance 
 
CEO 
Compensation 
 
Shareholder 
Wealth 
 
H2 H1
11 
H3 
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1.4. Research framework and methodology 
 
In an attempt to answer the research questions in a South African context, a longitudinal, 
quantitative research approach is adopted and the study examines a sample of the top 100 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) listed companies, covering a 10 year period ending in 
December 2013. The research endeavours to establish whether a relationship exists between the 
following: 
• The strength of corporate governance controls. 
• The compensation paid to CEOs. 
• The value created for shareholders. 
 
The data for the concept measures were obtained from the annual reports of the sample companies 
and the I-Net Bridge database. Regression and correlation analysis is used to test the relationships. 
 
The chapters in this study are organised as follows: 
• A review of the literature relevant to the topic. 
• An account of the research methods employed. 
• The data gathering and preparation process. 
• The statistical analysis utilised and the results thereof. 
 
It culminates with chapters interpreting and discussing the results, providing insights into problems 
encountered and a concluding chapter that includes recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 - Literature review 
 
2.1. Overview 
 
This chapter aims to provide a thorough review of the literature relating to economic and business 
management research. Specifically, the main objective is to gain a comprehensive understanding 
of the topic and to attempt to collate the concepts, constructs and theories relating to: 
• The principal- agent problem (agency problem). 
• Corporate governance. 
• Shareholder wealth creation. 
• CEO compensation. 
 
The review seeks to assist in refining the research problem from the conceptual, to a testable 
hypothesis stage and to confirm the choice of the statistical analysis process. 
 
The CRAAP test criteria suggested by California State University (2010) was broadly employed to 
filter the literature. This assists in establishing the appropriateness of an article in terms of whether 
it is: 
• Current, in respect of when it was written and whether it is the latest version. 
• Relevant, regarding the research topic and provides a convincing/compelling theoretical 
argument with interesting empirical results. 
• Authoritative, in that it is a peer-reviewed journal article and also extensively cited by other 
researchers. The authors have credible credentials, qualifications and associations. 
• Accurate, checking confirms that sources are reliable, truthful and correct. 
• Purpose, establishing whether the authors were objective and considerate of other views or 
biased, e.g.; an opinion-piece or propaganda/marketing. 
 
The literature reviewed is planned around using these theories and concepts as a framework with 
an initial focus on international articles and then South African published articles on the topic. 
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2.2. The agency problem 
 
By redefining the research questions introduced in Chapter 1, the intention of the research would 
be presented as an attempt to: 
• Measure the alignment of CEO compensation (CC) to shareholder returns for SA listed 
companies. 
• Establish whether corporate governance (CG) measures have any impact on the CC and 
shareholder return relationship. 
 
The above objectives generally reflect concepts contained in the principal-agent problem, namely: 
• Principal (Owner/Shareholder): The concept, firm’s performance, with total shareholder returns 
(TSR) as a proxy for shareholder value. 
• Agent (Executive Director/CEO): The concept of CEO compensation. 
 
In the previous chapter, the views of Brigham and Daves (2010) and Bebchuk and Fried (2003) 
were introduced relating to the agency problem. 
 
Jacoby (2005) relates that in the book by Berle and Means (1932) titled “The modern corporation 
and private property” it is observed that “large American corporations had ceased being controlled 
by their owners and that control had passed into the hands of a new class of professional managers.” 
The author recounts that this is due to the wealth of founding families being split up and new shares 
being made available to millions of individuals which ultimately left executives with the discretion 
to do what they considered to be in the best interest of the corporation. 
 
In an analysis article by Stigler and Friedland (1983) on the work of Berle and Means (1932), they 
describe the main theory of the work as follows: 
• The assumption that an individual is protected in the right to use their property as they wish and 
to receive the full benefits of its use for profit, is a real incentive for the efficient use of any 
industrial property they may possess. 
• In the so called public corporation, such an assumption does not exist, as it is no longer the 
individual who uses their own wealth, but the managers of the corporation. 
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• Those in control of the individual’s wealth and in a position to produce profits, the managers, 
are no longer entitled to the bulk of such profits. 
• The managers who control the fortunes of the modern corporation typically own a fraction of 
the company's shares and the returns from running the company profitably, accrue to them 
minimally. 
• The shareholders to whom the profits of the corporation accrue, cannot be motivated by those 
profits to a more efficient use of the property, since they have surrendered ownership of it to 
those in control of the enterprise. 
An investigation by the researchers on the shareholding of 200 non-financial United States 
corporations during the time of the Berle and Means (1932) opus, confirms that there was no 
effective shareholder in 44% of these corporations thereby deducing that a large number of 
shareholders had no effective say in the management of the corporations they had invested in. 
 
The work by Smith (1776:941) in the book titled “Wealth of Nations” refers to an agency problem 
by relating that the directors of joint stock companies, being the managers of other peoples’ money 
and not their own, cannot well be expected to be as vigilant as the partners in private companies 
would be and in some instances would be more predisposed to enriching themselves. Eisenhardt 
(1989) describes the agency problem as an ever-present agency relationship and that this forms part 
of agency theory. The author suggests that two problems can occur in agency relationships: 
• The agency problem; when the desires and goals of the principal and agent conflict and it is 
problematic and costly for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing. 
• Risk sharing; the principal and agent have different attitudes toward risk. 
 
Agency theory is described by Coles, McWilliams, and Sen (2001) as a focus on the resolution of 
conflicts of interest between principals and agents to ensure that a firm’s managers act in the 
interests of its shareholders and further asserts that firms can employ interventions to align the 
interests of the parties and to monitor the activity of agents (managers). The authors suggest two 
important mechanisms that can be employed to align the interests of managers (CEOs) and owners 
(shareholders): 
• Organisational monitoring: Board and leadership structure. 
• CEO incentives: Compensation and ownership. 
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Additionally, the optimal contracting view, proposed by Bebchuk and Fried (2003), recognises that 
managers suffer from an agency problem and do not normally seek to maximise shareholder value. 
The two governance factors that Schooley, Renner and Allen (2010) offer which may reduce the 
agency problem, are: 
• Board composition, “independent” if the majority of the directors are non-executive. 
• Leadership structure, regarded as “split” if the CEO is not the chairperson of the board. 
 
The afore-mentioned literature highlights an agency problem being referred to more than two 
hundred years ago by Smith (1776) and that the problem developed into a theory with numerous 
views and suggestions to alleviate it which alludes to robust corporate governance measures being 
a key component in aligning the principal-agent relationship. 
 
2.3. Corporate governance 
 
2.3.1. Definition 
 
Corporate governance is defined by OECD (2004) as, “a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides 
the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those 
objectives and monitoring performance are determined”. 
 
The British Cadbury (1992) report, describes corporate governance as “the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled. Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of 
their companies. The shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors 
and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance structure is in place”. The report further 
asserts that the responsibilities of the board include: 
• Setting the company’s strategic aims. 
• Providing the leadership to put them into effect. 
• Supervising the management of the business. 
• Reporting to shareholders on their stewardship. 
 
The Cadbury (1992) and OECD (2004) definitions include references to, structure, strategic aims, 
objectives, leadership, supervision and monitoring. 
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2.3.2. Corporate governance measures 
 
The earlier examination of the literature on the agency problem, offer suggestions and the opinions 
of researchers regarding the methods to be engaged which may enable the effective monitoring of 
the relationship between the board and its shareholders. The suggestions include, majority 
independent (non-executive directors) on the board and optimal and performance related CEO 
compensation contracts, amongst other. 
 
A Baysinger and Butler (1985) study, that spans a period from 1970 to 1980, reveals that American 
firms with a board that had a higher proportion of independent (non-executive) directors earlier, 
namely, beginning 1970’s, showed higher performance at the end of 1980. This result was 
supported by the later studies of Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) and Coles et al (2001). 
 
Board independence is supported by Hertig (2005) who proposes that reforms can be divided into 
three broad categories. Firstly, the reinforcing of the powers of shareholders and auditors which is 
aimed at reducing board discretion, secondly, improving board independence and finally, targeting 
director incentives through compensation and liability provisions. Research by Bebchuk and 
Weisbach (2010:943) agrees by suggesting that boards would be more effective if the structure had 
more independent directors and comments on the reforms, post the Enron and WorldCom scandals, 
introduced by stock exchanges to increase board independence requirements. 
 
Prior research by Klein (1998) contradicts the above suggestions, as the author found no association 
between firm’s performance and overall board composition. However, a positive relationship was 
found between the percentage of inside directors on finance and investment committees and 
accounting and share market performance measures. 
 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) assert that the relationship between investors and managers is a 
power-sharing association that is defined by the rules of corporate governance. This is likened to 
corporations being republics and that the ultimate authority should rest with the voters, namely, the 
shareholders. The shareholders elect directors who delegate most decisions to the managers. This 
power-sharing relationship is dependent on a specific set of governance rules that could create a 
democracy where the power vests with the shareholders which would allow an easy process to 
replace directors or, on the other extreme, a dictatorship, where the shareholders ability to replace 
the directors are intensely restricted. 
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The Gompers et al (2003) research uses a 24 element “Governance Index” to proxy for the level of 
shareholder rights and finds that firms with strong governance have higher firm value, profits, sales 
growth and lower capital expenditures. The Core, Guay and Rusticus (2006) study concurs with 
Gompers et al (2003) and finds that firms with weak shareholder rights show significant operating 
under-performance. However, their overall results cannot convincingly show that weak governance 
is the cause of poor shareholder returns. 
 
A study by Larcker, Richardson and Tuna (2007) redefines the components used in the Gompers et 
al (2003) governance index. They find that their 14 dimensional governance index has some ability 
to explain future operating performance and future excess share returns. Subsequent research by 
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) supports these findings and reports that the indices; share ownership, the 
separation of the CEO and chairperson positions, is positively correlated to better current period 
and subsequent period operating performance. A research paper by Varshney, Kaul and Vasal 
(2012) provide a perspective from India using a governance index to proxy for performance. They 
find that there is a positive correlation between high governance index firms when related to the 
economic value added (EVA) company performance measure. 
 
In a later study, Bhagat, Bolton and Romano (2008) caution that governance indices are imperfect 
instruments from which to draw inferences regarding a firm’s quality or future share performance. 
They postulate that “it would be difficult for an index, or any one variable, to capture nuances 
critical for making informed decisions.” Opposing results are reported by Johnson, Moorman and 
Sorescu (2009), who reveal that for firms sorted on strong governance indices, no long term 
abnormal returns are observed. 
 
2.3.3. Regulatory governance measures 
 
Notwithstanding, the afore-mentioned theories and methods discussed and suggested by researchers 
of corporate governance, it should be noted that exchange listed firms are highly regulated in terms 
of the laws of the countries in which they operate. With specific reference to the USA and the UK, 
there are a number of Acts that have been promulgated and agencies formed to improve and monitor 
the measures of corporate governance. These include: 
• Rigid stock exchange listing requirements. 
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• The USA’s Sarbanes–Oxley Act 2002 (SOX): According to Ernst and Young (2012), the 
primary purpose of the legislation is to increase investor confidence in the financial reports 
provided by corporations. 
• Securities Exchange Commission (SEC): A U.S. government agency that oversees securities 
transactions, activities of financial professionals and mutual fund trading to prevent fraud and 
intentional deception (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2016). 
• The US Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB 2016): The PCAOB is a non-
profit corporation established by the US Congress to oversee the audits of public companies in 
order to protect investors and the public interest. The PCAOB also oversees the audits of brokers 
and dealers, including compliance reports filed pursuant to federal securities laws, to promote 
investor protection. 
• UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA 2016): The FCA replaced the Financial Services 
Authority from April 2013 and is the prudential regulator for over 24,000 firms. The Prudential 
Regulation Authority (PRA) has become the regulator of banks, building societies, credit 
unions, insurers and designated investment firms. 
• UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC 2014): First produced in 1992 by the Cadbury 
Committee. The Code of Best Practice which forms part of the Cadbury report was implemented 
by the London Stock Exchange (LSE) on a comply or explain basis and included the issues of 
separating the role of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman; suggested the use of non-
executive directors (NEDs) and the desirability of independence, recommended the appointment 
of NEDs to an audit committee of the board of directors, all in the interests of providing some 
oversight and checks and balances to corporate decision making. 
• UK Financial Reporting Council (FRC 2014): The audit regulator for the United Kingdom which 
promotes high levels of audit quality and contributes to the international debate on the future of 
the audit market. The FRC also promotes high quality corporate governance and reporting, 
publishing Codes and Standards that companies, auditors, actuaries and accountants adopt. 
 
2.3.4. Corporate governance – A South African perspective 
 
Sarra (2004:21) states that “corporate governance….involves creating the proper incentives for 
individuals in the management of the corporation.” The article suggests that in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
the governance debate is framed by the tension between the need to attract foreign investment and 
the need to address pressing social, economic and environmental issues. 
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In a review of the developments in South African corporate governance since the end of apartheid, 
West (2009) asserts that South African companies, like many other Commonwealth countries, have 
corporate structures that generally resemble those of the UK and operate in a corporate governance 
environment that could be considered a modified Anglo-American corporate governance system. 
The review suggests that links to this system appear to have strengthened given: 
• The adoption of international financial reporting standards (IFRS) in 2005. 
• The legislating of the Auditing Professions Act in 2005. 
• The number of South African companies that have moved their primary listings to the UK or 
USA. 
 
Similar to the USA and UK, corporate governance in South Africa is further improved by, 
government appointed commissions, government legislation and regulation authorities. Key 
examples of these are: 
• The Companies Act 2008 
According to Bowman Gilfillan (2014), the groundwork for the preparation of the Act was 
produced in a 2004 policy paper produced by the Department of Trade and Industries (dti), which 
identified five economic growth objectives, together with specific goals related to each of them, 
as being necessary to achieve a company law regime that would provide a protective and fertile 
environment for economic activity. These five objectives that the intended company law should 
promote and encourage are: 
- Competitiveness and development of the South African economy by means of simplifying 
the law. 
- Innovation and investment in South African markets and companies by being flexible 
- The efficiency of companies and their management. 
- Transparency and high standards of corporate governance. 
- Investment in South African markets and companies by providing for a predictable and 
effective regulatory environment. 
The above objectives and an additional goal, namely, harmonisation, ensuring that company law 
should be made compatible and harmonious with best practice jurisdictions internationally, are 
specifically addressed in the Companies Act of 2008 which came into effect on the 1st of May 
2011. 
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• JSE listing requirements (JSE 2016) 
The listings requirements contain the rules and procedures governing new applications, all 
corporate actions and continuing obligations applicable to issuers and issuers of specialist 
securities. They are furthermore aimed at ensuring that the business of the JSE is carried on with 
due regard to the public interest. 
• Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 (Act No. 2. 2000) 
The act gives effect to the constitutional right of access to any information held by the State and 
any information that is held by another person and that is required for the exercise or protection 
of any rights. 
• Financial Services Board (FSB 2016) 
The FSB is an independent institution established by statute to oversee the South African Non-
Banking Financial Services Industry in the public interest. Its mission and vision are to promote 
and maintain a sound financial investment in South Africa. 
• Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors (IRBA 2016) 
The function of the IRBA is to help create an ethical, value-driven financial sector that 
encourages investment, creates confidence in the financial markets and promotes sound 
practices. 
• The South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA 2015) 
The mission of SAICA is to promote and lead the chartered accountancy profession so as to 
create sustainable value for its members and other stakeholders by, amongst other: 
- Fostering ethics, integrity, sound governance and good citizenship at an individual and 
corporate level. 
- Enhancing the quality of business information and reporting for the benefit of all 
stakeholders. 
- Working with international professional bodies and organisations to establish and maintain 
standards for the chartered accountancy profession and global economy. 
• King reports on governance (IoDSA 2009) 
Rossouw, van der Watt and Malan (2002) recounts that the first King report on corporate 
governance in 1994 created unprecedented interest in the topic in South Africa. The article 
provides a view of the corporate landscape going back to the 1980’s, the existing laws and 
agencies that enforces good corporate behaviour and reviews of possible future governance 
controls. In a subsequent article, Rossouw (2005) reveals that the inclusive model of corporate 
governance was first introduced in 1994 and has been enhanced in the second King Report 
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(referred to as King II) in 2002 by presenting numerous motivations for adopting an inclusive 
approach which include: 
- The long-term sustainability of companies. 
- Respect for the local community and the society in which a company operates. 
- The need to earn a license to operate from all stakeholders of the corporation. 
 
According to IoDSA (2009), the third King report (King III) on corporate governance in South 
Africa which came into effect in September 2009, became necessary due to the new Companies 
Act of 2008 and the changes in international governance trends. The publisher further states that 
‘following King II, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange Limited (JSE) required listed companies 
to include in their annual report a narrative statement as to how they had complied with the 
principles set out in King II, providing explanations that would enable stakeholders to evaluate 
the extent of the company‘s compliance and stating whether the reasons for non-compliance 
were justified’. 
 
As the recommendations in the report are technically non-regulatory, that is, not enforceable by 
law, an “apply or explain” approach is adopted and its practical execution is reported by IoDSA 
(2009) as follows: 
‘It is the legal duty of directors to act in the best interests of the company. In following the ‘apply 
or explain’ approach, the board of directors, in its collective decision-making, could conclude 
that to follow a recommendation would not, in the particular circumstances, be in the best 
interests of the company. The board could decide to apply the recommendation differently or 
apply another practice and still achieve the objective of the overarching corporate governance 
principles of fairness, accountability, responsibility and transparency. Explaining how the 
principles and recommendations were applied, or if not applied, the reasons, results in 
compliance. In reality, the ultimate compliance officer is not the company’s compliance officer 
or a bureaucrat ensuring compliance with statutory provisions, but the stakeholders’. 
 
Further, the report reveals that there are examples of exchange listed South African companies 
that have not followed the recommended practices. However, in support of the ‘apply or explain’ 
approach, these companies provided reasons why the practice they adopted was in the best 
interests of the company. The report further states that South African listed companies are 
regarded by foreign institutional investors as being among the best governed of the emerging 
economies in the world. It reports that, South Africa has benefited from its listed companies’ 
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following good governance principles, which was evidenced by the significant capital inflows 
into South Africa before the global financial crisis of 2008. 
 
2.3.5. Summary 
 
The academic articles and supplementary analysis provides interesting insights into the world of 
corporate governance. A better understanding of the underlying theories have been obtained with 
specific reference to the: 
• Assumed variables and components of corporate governance. 
• Indices created by various researchers to proxy for corporate governance. 
• Regulatory environments in which companies operate. 
 
2.4. Shareholder wealth and the firm’s performance 
 
Bacidore, Boquist, Milbourn and Thakor (1997) suggest that the firm’s performance measures used 
in the design of executive remuneration plans should be aligned with changes in shareholder wealth 
and should not be subject to all the "noise" inherent in a firm's share price. 
 
Murphy (1998) avers that an executive’s wealth is directly (explicitly) tied to the principal’s 
objective, namely, creating shareholder wealth through shareholding and share options and in 
addition, indirectly (implicitly) tied to share price performance through accounting based bonuses 
and in year to year adjustments in salary, bonuses and share option grant sizes. The variable for 
firm’s performance in the study refers to two shareholder value measures, namely: 
• The rate of return realised by shareholders. 
• The rate of return on the common share, but ignores share issues and repurchases. 
 
Apart from the above, there are a number of accounting and non-accounting measures that are used 
to measure firm’s performance and shareholder wealth maximisation. In what follows, 
consideration will be given to a number of different measures that proxy for performance and by 
implication, shareholder wealth creation, when evaluating the relationships between company 
performance, corporate governance and CEO compensation. 
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2.4.1. ROE and ROA 
 
Return on equity (ROE) is described by Higgins (2007) as net income divided by shareholders’ 
equity, whereas return on assets (ROA) is defined as net income divided by assets. The author states 
that ROA is a measure of the efficiency with which a company allocates and manages its resources 
and differs from ROE in that it measures returns as a percentage of the money provided by 
shareholders and creditors, whilst ROE only measures the percentage return based on the money 
provided by the owners. 
 
A study by Baysinger and Butler (1985) on the effects of corporate governance variables on 
company performance introduces relative financial performance (RFP) as a measure to proxy for 
firm’s performance. RFP is calculated by dividing the firm’s return on equity (ROE) by the average 
ROE of all the firms in its primary sector. ROE and ROA are two of the four performance variables 
used in a study by Abowd (1990) attempting to establish the effects of performance based 
compensation on company performance. A South African article by Theunissen and Oberholzer 
(2013) uses ROE as one of the measures for the company’s performance variable. 
 
The use of ROA as a proxy for the firm’s performance is employed in research by Core et al (1999) 
which suggest that firms with greater agency problems perform worse. In a later investigation on 
the Gompers et al (2003) work, Core et al (2006) repeats the use of ROA to measure firm’s 
performance. Bhagat and Bolton (2008), also in replicating the Gompers et al (2003) study, use 
firm performance variables that include ROA. In subsequent research by Bhagat et al (2008), ROA 
for the current, next year and next two years is used to measure company performance. 
A modified version of ROA (less depreciation) is utilised by Ertugrul and Hegde (2009) for 
company performance when compared to corporate governance ratings and an adjusted measure of 
ROA is used by Pissaris, Jeffus and Gleason (2010) when examining the impact of pay disparity 
and corporate governance on corporate performance 
 
2.4.2. Tobin’s Q 
 
A Mehran (1995) study which suggests that it provides evidence for supporters of incentive 
compensation, uses Tobin’s Q as a proxy for performance which is measured by the ratio of the 
market value of the firm’s securities to the replacement cost of its tangible assets. 
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Attempting to find evidence as to whether corporate governance predict firm’s market values in 
Korea, Black, Jang and Kim (2006) use Tobin’s Q to proxy for the firm’s value. 
 
Tobin’s Q is also the preferred  unit of measure of an enterprise’s valuation in an article by Bebchuk, 
Cohen and Ferrell (2009) when analysing their six provision corporate governance entrenchment 
index as a predictor of a firm’s value and is included as a performance measure in the Bhagat and 
Bolton (2008) examination. 
 
2.4.3. Economic value added (EVA) 
 
The Varshney et al (2012) study that replicates the Gompers et al (2003) research uses EVA as the 
primary metric to measure firm’s performance. 
 
Bacidore et al (1997) asserts that although the most appropriate measure of shareholder value is the 
return shareholders earn through price appreciation and dividends, EVA is a good proxy in terms 
of its correlation with the total shareholder return (TSR) measure of shareholder value creation. 
However, they propose that a better measure of the capital used in the firm, for any period of time, 
is the market value of the firm at the beginning of the period which leads to a refinement of the 
EVA measure, termed refined economic value added (REVA). 
 
A South African perspective is provided by West (2006) in an article on corporate governance, who 
recommends the use of EVA as a performance indicator and is supported by De Wet (2012) 
proposing that EVA and market value add (MVA) are better measures than that of traditional 
accounting performance measures such as earnings per share (EPS), ROA and return on equity 
(ROE). 
 
2.4.4. Total shareholder return (TSR) 
 
Bacidore et al (1997) suggest that TSR is the most appropriate measure of shareholder wealth and 
it is also found to be the measure most commonly used by researchers in the literature consulted. 
PWC (2012) provides a South African perspective, proposing that earnings per share (EPS) and 
TSR are two key performance indicators that should be included when designing executive 
remuneration packages, specifically targeting LTIs.  
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Jensen and Murphy (1990) use TSR exclusively in their research article on performance pay and 
management incentives. Concurring with this, the Dalton and Aguinis (2013) study, suggest that 
TSR, which in their opinion is a performance measure seldom relied on when examining the 
governance and firm’s performance relationship, is a superior metric because it has a direct 
connection to shareholders. 
 
In research by Coombs and Gilley (2005), where stakeholder management (SM) is employed as a 
predictor of CEO compensation and its effects on financial performance. Firm size, ROA and TSR 
are employed as measures of financial performance. This is supported by an Ericson (2011) article 
reviewing the performance standards that should be considered when benchmarking executive 
incentive pay which includes total shareholder return (TSR) as one of the measures. 
 
The Farmer, Archbold and Alexandrou (2013) research provide evidence from the UK of the use 
of TSR to proxy for the firm’s performance, when comparing CEO compensation to relative 
performance evaluation (RPE). TSR also proxies for shareholder wealth in the Haynes, Campbell, 
and Hitt (2014) study that examine the effects of the concept executive greed on company wealth. 
A European analysis on corporate governance, industry dynamics and firm’ performance by Krafft, 
Qu and Ravix (2008) rely on TSR as the measure for firm’s performance. 
 
The studies by Abowd (1990) and Core et al (1999) includes total shareholder return (TSR) as a 
measure of company performance. In a later investigation Core et al (2006) again uses TSR to 
measure firm’s performance.  
 
Edwards (1994) in an article suggesting the use of TSR as the measurement for compensation plans 
which is supported by Gompers et al (2003) as a measure of choice in the research article which 
appears to have provided the benchmark from a corporate governance index perspective and is 
extensively studied, replicated and cited. 
 
2.4.5. Summary 
 
In one of the few South African studies, an investigation by Scholtz and Smit (2012) on the 
relationship between short-term executive compensation and company performance, suggest the 
following less often used measures to proxy for performance: 
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• Turnover (Sales). 
• Earnings before interest tax depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA). 
• Total assets. 
• Share price. 
 
In conclusion, an overwhelming number of the statistical analysis reviewed on similar research, 
include TSR as a measure for shareholder wealth. 
 
2.5. CEO compensation 
 
The preceding literature suggests that the design of a CEO’s remuneration contract could play a 
positive role in alleviating the agency problem. Murphy (1998) asserts that most executive pay 
packages are made up of four basic components, namely: 
• A base salary. 
• An annual bonus tied to accounting performance. 
• Share options. 
• Long-term incentive plans. 
 
Von Glinow (1985) submits that the design of organizational reward systems that explicitly 
addresses attraction, evaluation, and retention of valued professionals is offered within four cultural 
contexts: the Apathetic -; the Caring -, the Exacting - and the Integrative Culture. The article 
suggests one would place the CEO in the Exacting culture given that within this culture, 
performance expectations are high and individuals are expected to be at a sustained level of high 
performance. A typical reward system suggested for this dimension includes profit sharing and 
share ownership with firm’s performance being the sole evaluation measure. The research further 
reveals that top executives are increasingly negotiating formal employment contracts that typically 
last five years which specifies minimum base salaries, target bonus payments and severance 
arrangements. 
 
A research article by Abowd and Kaplan (1999) which considers the implications of the Murphy 
(1998) study, deconstructs CEO compensation into the following four components: 
• Salary, being cash compensation defined at the beginning of the annual pay cycle. 
• Annual bonus, defined as cash compensation at the end of the annual pay cycle. 
 
 
 
 
Page | 29  
 
• Benefits, being the company’s cost to provide retirement income, health care and other services 
evaluated on an annual basis. 
• Long-term compensation, the annualised present value of any cash, or cash equivalent that is 
based on outcomes over periods of more than one year. 
 
Bender and Moir (2006) report that the current tendencies governing executive pay in the UK 
include: 
• Market benchmarks that determine salary and bonus levels. 
• High levels of performance related pay. 
• A desire for executives to hold equity in their companies. 
• Disclosure of TSR compared to an index. 
• A perceived need for conformity in order to legitimise policies. 
 
Further research on UK companies by Conyon and Peck (1998), explain the effects of board control 
and remuneration committees on determining management compensation, which exclude some 
measures of compensation such as share options as the data was not easily available. Their measures 
for compensation consisted of salary, bonus and miscellaneous earnings.  
 
In a Hambrick and Finkelstein (1995) study on CEO pay changes, compensation is measured as the 
sum of cash pay, described as salary, bonus, and miscellaneous fringe benefits, plus the value of 
stock options granted during the year, with stock options priced by way of a modified version of 
the Black-Scholes option valuation model. 
 
South African views are provided by Bussin and Huysamen (2004) whose study have components 
of remuneration that include base pay, fringe benefits, short and long term incentives and Scholtz 
and Smit (2012) in their investigation on JSE’s alternative exchange (AltX) listed companies, who 
employ a total cash remuneration (excluding share options) measure, which include a base salary, 
benefits and annual bonus. 
 
Additional South African related articles include research by De Wet (2012) employing the 
dependent variable, total directors’ remuneration (TDR) to proxy for CEO compensation. The 
components are made up of the basic salary, bonus and options and the data was obtained from the 
McGregor BFA database. However no explanation is provided as to how the share options value 
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was arrived at. In their data envelopment research approach on JSE listed companies, Theunissen 
and Oberholzer (2013) include base pay, prerequisites and pension (other benefits), annual bonus 
and long term incentives (gains on shares) as a measure for remuneration. 
 
When reviewing the literature, there is general consensus that the components of CEO 
compensation include four basic elements: 
• A base salary. 
• Other fringe benefits such as travel, pension and medical aid costs to company. 
• An annual bonus, also referred to as short term incentive (STI). 
• Share options, which acts as an incentive to possibly reward the meeting of short and long term 
performance objectives. 
 
It is observed that some studies exclude the share option component, due to a lack of information 
when attempting to include share options as a component of the compensation variable. 
 
2.6. Overall summary of reviewed literature 
 
The review of the literature proved instrumental in shaping and defining the research problem with 
reference to: 
 
• Corporate governance 
The Gompers et al (2003) research and that of Core et al (1999) provide the basis for a corporate 
governance index (CGI) to proxy for corporate governance. 
•  Shareholder value 
A vast number of the quantitative studies reviewed, used TSR as a measure for company 
performance. In a South African context, given the highly rated JSE, ranked first in the world with 
respect to regulation of securities exchanges in the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Survey for 2013-2014, TSR should be a suitable proxy for company performance 
and/or shareholder wealth. 
• CEO compensation 
In the reviewed international articles, a number of measures for CC includes long term incentives 
as a component of CEO compensation. These were calculated using various methods, mostly using 
the Black-Scholes method which is defined as a pricing model used to determine the fair price or 
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theoretical value for a call or a put option based on six variables such as volatility, type of option, 
underlying stock price, time, strike price, and risk-free rate (Economic Times 2014). 
 
The JSE outline the complete disclosure requirements, when reporting on directors’ remuneration 
in the listed companies’ annual reports, as per clause and sub clauses 7.B.7. This includes share 
options or any other right given which has had the same or a similar effect in respect of providing 
a right to subscribe for shares (“share options”). The detail to be provided includes: 
- The opening balance of share options, including the number of shares. 
- Options at each different strike price. 
- The number of share options awarded and their strike prices. 
- The strike dates of differing lots of options awarded. 
- The number of share options exercised and at what prices. 
- The closing balance of share options, including the number of share. 
- Options at each different strike price. 
- The above may be presented in tabular form. 
 
On perusing the annual reports of listed SA companies, it is noted that all companies, by and large, 
are adhering to the above reporting format. However, this clause does not enforce companies to 
report the actual cost of the share options, per director, as expensed on the income statements of the 
respective companies as per the IFRS2 guideline. This ambiguity has resulted in either, a number 
of SA listed companies not reporting the cost of options expensed per director in the remuneration 
section of their annual reports, alternatively, when reported, some companies comply in an 
inconsistent fashion. 
 
• Statistical methods 
 
The literature reviewed provide an immense amount of information on the key concepts of the topic 
and the methods deployed in deconstructing the concepts into measures to be utilised in the 
statistical analysis. It is observed that regression and correlation analysis were utilised in most of 
the reviewed quantitative studies. 
 
Whilst concluding the literature review, it is important to note that there is a dearth of published 
literature by South African researchers on the topic. With a few exceptions, the initial articles 
 
 
 
 
Page | 32  
 
filtered did not conform to the intense analysis provided by the studies conducted by the global 
academics. 
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CHAPTER 3 – Research methods 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Chapters 1 and 2 provide the background and context in which the topic was explored. The 
introduction and literature review suggest that there is not an alignment of CEO compensation with 
shareholder returns. 
 
The primary research questions to be addressed, for the period 2004 to 2013, are: 
• Is CEO compensation aligned to shareholder returns? 
• Does corporate governance play a role in improving the alignment of CEO compensation and 
shareholder returns? 
 
The proposed null hypothesis (H0) is that: 
“Poor corporate governance prevails in South African listed companies resulting in CEO 
compensation not being aligned to shareholder wealth creation”. 
 
This chapter details the research methods employed to gather the information and the statistical 
techniques used to test the hypothesis. 
 
3.2. Research approach 
 
A longitudinal, quantitative research approach has been adopted to conduct the study. This is 
consistent with Bryman, Bell, Hirschsohn, dos Santos, du Toit, Masenge, van Aardt and Wagner 
(2014:31) who submit that “a quantitative research approach tends to emphasise the collection and 
analysis of data and adopts a deductive approach to the relationship between theory and research, 
in which the emphasis is placed on the testing of theories”. 
 
3.3. Population 
 
The study focuses on listed companies in South Africa, namely; those listed on the JSE. The JSE 
was formed in 1887 and is currently ranked the 19th largest stock exchange in the world by market 
capitalisation and the largest exchange on the African continent (JSE 2016). As at the end of 
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December 2013, the listed companies totalled 389 with a market capitalisation of more than R 10.6 
trillion. 
 
3.4. Sample 
 
According to Wegner (2012), a sample is a subset of data values drawn from the population. The 
subset used for the study is a sample extracted from the top 100 companies on the JSE as at 
December 2013. 
 
A schedule of the top 100 JSE listed companies with market capitalisation values as at December 
2013, was obtained from the JSE’s information centre and captured on a data control sheet to 
monitor the data collection process (see example Appendix 1). This was narrowed down to the final 
subset of 38 companies primarily due to the following data collection problems: 
• 14 of the top 100 companies were listed post the base year of the study, namely, 2003. 
• 45 companies were excluded due to the required information and data not being available from 
a number of their annual reports. 
• 2 were excluded as they were dual listed, therefore the data from the annual reports of the JSE 
listed entity was used. 
• African Bank (ABIL) was placed under curatorship and thus virtually no information was 
available. 
 
See Appendix 2 for a list of the excluded companies. 
 
The final sample is made up of 38 companies with a market capitalisation of more than R 4.0 trillion 
as at the end of December 2013. The top 100 companies’ market capitalisation equates to 
approximately R 9.5 trillion and the sample represents 42% of the market capitalisation of the top 
100 JSE listed companies as at the end of 2013. 
 
3.5. Data collection methods 
 
Data was collected from the companies’ annual reports and the I-Net Bridge database and is referred 
to as secondary data by Wegner (2012), who also describes one of the main advantages of secondary 
data as its ease of access. 
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A data collection spreadsheet was designed (see Appendix 3), for the purpose of capturing the data 
from the annual reports for CGI and CC and from the I-Net Bridge database in respect of share 
prices and dividends, the essential components required to calculate TSR. Formulae were inserted 
in the appropriate cells to calculate the required values for the concept measures, in order to test the 
relationship between the variables. 
 
3.6. Concepts and variables 
 
The concepts were previously identified and reduced, in Chapter 1 and 2, to variables that can be 
operationalised to provide values for statistical analysis. The composition and description of these 
variables are detailed hereafter. 
 
3.6.1. Corporate Governance Index (CGI) 
 
A mediating variable that reflects the strength of governance by means of an annual four component 
corporate governance index (CGI), comprising of board composition and ownership elements (see 
Appendix 3). The CGI was informed by the measurable elements in the King III report and 
institutional shareholder ownership as suggested by researchers. A collation of the data values for 
the corporate governance index is reflected on Appendix 4 and a summary of the annual values are 
reflected on the table below. 
 
 
 
The annual CGI scores were ranked (see Appendix 3) and the period movement, the years 2004 to 
2013, is reflected in Figure 1, below. 
YEAR 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
CGI RANK 10% 20% 50% 50% 50% 100% 70% 70% 80% 90%
CGI % 0.00% 2.50% 1.63% 0.00% 0.00% 4.80% -3.05% 0.00% 0.79% 1.56%
CGI % (x10) 0.00% 25.00% 16.26% 0.00% 0.00% 48.00% -30.53% 0.00% 7.87% 15.63%
TABLE 3.6.1.
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(Note: CGI% (x10) is included to improve the graphical representation of the Mean %) 
 
3.6.2. CEO Compensation (CC) 
 
The dependent variable measured as an annual percentage increase (or decrease) in the total pay of 
the CEO. Long term incentives (share options) are excluded as a component of CEO compensation 
due to the lack of and inconsistent information provided by some companies in their annual reports. 
CC therefore comprises of, salary, the annual bonus and other fringe benefits. A summary of the 
companies with the data values are presented in Appendix 5. The annual values are reflected on the 
table below. 
 
 
 
The following chart, Figure 2, graphically displays the percentage movement over the ten year 
period. 
Figure 1. CGI Ranked and Annual Mean %  Change with Mean %  (x10)
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CGI RANK CGI % CGI % (x10)
YEAR 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
% change 28.36% 18.88% 41.13% 27.59% 12.25% -3.33% 24.85% 32.21% -3.27% 10.15%
TABLE 3.6.2.
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3.6.3. Total shareholder return (TSR) 
 
TSR, an independent variable which is measured as an annual percentage increase (or decrease) is 
calculated using the following formula: 
 
TSR = (SP1 – SP0)   +  D  x  100 
                   SP0 
Where: 
SP0: Equals the share price at the beginning of the period. 
SP1: Equals the share price at the end of the period. 
D: Equals dividends paid during the period. 
 
Actual shareholder wealth created is more accurately measured by TSR than any other accounting 
or non-accounting measure such as EVA. A collation of the companies and data values for total 
shareholder returns are presented in Appendix 6. A summary of the annual values and that of the 
applicable FTSE/JSE All Share Index (ALSI), namely, the ALSI J203, are reflected on the table 
below. 
 
 
Figure 2. CEO Compensation (CC) 2004 to 2013
-10.00%
-5.00%
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20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
40.00%
45.00%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
YEAR 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 TOTALS
TSR 46.98% 67.68% 64.73% 41.44% -5.98% 3.28% 36.38% 14.54% 17.92% 16.50% 303.46%
ALSI 25.44% 47.25% 41.23% 19.19% -23.23% 32.13% 18.98% 2.57% 26.68% 21.43% 211.68%
TABLE 3.6.3.
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The annual values for the research period are graphically depicted in Figure 3, below. 
 
 
 
The above line chart reflects the TSR for the sample companies and the applicable FTSE/JSE All 
Share Index (ALSI), which includes dividends. It is interesting to note that the sample outperformed 
the ALSI, on average, by more than 9% per annum. The graphic displays the strong positive 
relationship between the sample companies and the ALSI. A regression and correlation analysis 
established that the 38 sample companies’ TSR is significantly aligned with the JSE’s ALSI. This 
suggests that the sample is a credible representation of the population. 
 
The regression results are reflected in Appendix 7. 
 
3.7. Data preparation 
 
Wegner (2012:17) states that “data is the lifeblood of statistical analysis and it must therefore be 
relevant, clean and in the correct format”. 
 
To ensure the reliability of the data, corrections were made, where required, after the following 
checks: 
• Abnormal annual value and percentage movements investigated to check for possible 
typographical and transposing errors and corrected if necessary. 
• Comparing data collected to that of student assignments which reflected data collected for a 
similar sample period to that of this study. 
Figure 3. TSR and ALSI Relationship
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• The appointment of independent specialists to sample check the data and values collected, 
formulae applied and statistical calculations. 
 
Additional data cleaning provided for the smoothing of CEO compensation when there were more 
than one CEO in a particular year. This involved averaging the new appointee’s compensation for 
the period. An example being the case of a CEO being replaced midway through the financial year 
resulting in the salaries of two CEOs being reflected on the annual reports. The incumbent CEO’s 
salary reflected in the annual report would be for part of the year and was thus smoothed and 
calculated to reflect the full earnings value for a year. 
 
3.8. Statistical methods 
 
Regression analysis and correlation analysis are described by Wegner (2012) as statistical tools 
employed to compute the relationship between variables and to measure the strength of the 
relationships. Microsoft’s Excel Data Analysis function was used to construct a regression model 
and perform the correlation analysis. 
 
Wegner (2012) describes the output results obtained as follows: 
• The correlation coefficient, reflected as Multiple R in the Excel results worksheets, is also 
referred to as Pearson’s correlation of coefficient and is represented by the symbol r when 
calculated from sample data. The graphic below will be used to interpret the strength of the 
relationship between the x and y variables. 
 
 
(Source Wegner 2012) 
 
• The coefficient of determination (r2), reflected as R Square in the Excel results worksheets, 
measures the percentage of variation in the dependent variable y, that is explained by the 
Strong 
negative
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independent variable, x. The following graphic will be used to assist with the interpretation of 
the results. 
 
 
(Source Wegner 2012) 
 
• Hypothesis testing for significance, the p-value approach, was adopted to test for significance, 
namely to accept or reject the null hypothesis. Wegner (2012) describes this method as, “a p-
value is a probability that indicates how likely it is to observe the sample statistic (or a more 
extreme value), if the null-hypothesised population parameter value is assumed to be true”. The 
author further states that the decision rule (based on a test at the 5% level of significance) to be 
used to decide when the p-value is small enough to reject H0 is as follows: 
- If the p-value is > 5%, accept H0. 
- If the p-value is < 5%, reject H0. 
 
3.9. Summary 
 
This chapter outlined the methods employed to arrive at the sample data and further substantiated 
the credibility of the sample data set when finding a significantly strong positive alignment between 
the sample and the JSE ALSI for the period 2004 to 2013. 
 
The following chapter provides the detail of the statistical process and presents the results of the 
statistical analysis. 
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CHAPTER 4 – Statistical analysis and results 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The statistical analysis seeks to find the significance of the relationship that exists between 
shareholder returns (TSR) and CEO compensation (CC) over a ten year period, beginning in 
January 2004 and ending December 2013. The results of the regression and correlation analysis 
will validate whether the null hypothesis should be supported or rejected. This first analysis is 
referred to as “year for year”. 
 
The second test is to establish the significance of the afore-mentioned relationships, retrospectively 
applying (lagging) CC data by a year, namely; year 2005 CC data compared to year 2004 TSR data. 
This results in one less observation, namely; 9 observations, as TSR data for 2012 would be 
compared to CC data for 2013. This second analysis is referred to as “lagged”. 
 
A further deliberation is to investigate whether corporate governance, as measured by the CGI, has 
any influence on the strength of the relationship between TSR and CC on a year for year and lagged 
basis and entails: 
• Creating a top (strong CGI) and bottom (weak CGI) grouping of the sample by ranking the 
companies based on CGI strength to statistically analyse the respective groupings TSR and CC 
relationships. 
• Period analysis of the relationship between the TSR and CC variables for split periods, namely, 
the first 5 and last 5 years, for both the total sample and the top and bottom CGI ranked 
companies. 
 
4.2. TSR and CC: Year for year basis - Regression and correlation analysis 
 
A simple regression model was used for each of the analysis below. The discussion that follows, 
identifies the dependent and independent variables and provides a commentary of the results. 
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4.2.1. Total sample 
 
The outputs presented in Table 4.2.1 results from using CC (y variable) as the dependent variable 
and TSR (x variable) as the independent variable. 
 
The Multiple R of 0.622 suggests a moderately positive correlation, r2 equals 38.7% indicating a 
moderate to weak explanation of the percentage variation in CC that can be attributed to TSR and 
the p-value of 0.055 is borderline and marginally > than 0.05 suggesting, tentatively, that the null 
hypothesis fails to be rejected, based on a test at the 5% level of significance. 
 
4.2.2. Top CGI 19 companies 
 
The outputs presented in Table 4.2.2 results from using CC (y variable) as the dependent variable 
and TSR (x variable) as the independent variable. 
 
The Multiple R of 0.645 suggests a moderate to strong positive correlation, r2 equals 41.6% 
indicating a weak explanation of the percentage variation in CC that can be attributed to TSR and 
the p-value of 0.044 is < than 0.05 suggesting the null hypothesis should be rejected, based on a 
test at the 5% level of significance. 
 
4.2.3. Bottom CGI 19 companies 
 
The outputs presented in Table 4.2.3 results from using CC (y variable) as the dependent variable 
and TSR (x variable) as the independent variable. 
 
The Multiple R of 0.473 suggests a weak positive correlation, r2 equals 22.3% indicating a weak 
explanation of the percentage variation in CC that can be attributed to TSR and the p-value of 0.168 
is > than 0.05 suggesting the null hypothesis fails to be rejected, based on a test at the 5% level of 
significance. 
 
4.2.4. Split periods: Period 1 (2004 to 2008) – Total sample 
 
The outputs presented in Table 4.2.4 results from using CC (y variable) as the dependent variable 
and TSR (x variable) as the independent variable. 
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The Multiple R of 0.646 suggests a moderate to strong positive correlation, r2 equals 41.7% 
indicating a very strong explanation of the percentage variation in CC that can be attributed to TSR 
and the p-value of 0.239 is considerably > than 0.05 suggesting the null hypothesis fails to be 
rejected, based on a test at the 5% level of significance. 
 
4.2.5. Split periods: Period 1 (2004 to 2008) – Top CGI 19 Companies 
 
The outputs presented in Table 4.2.5 results from using CC (y variable) as the dependent variable 
and TSR (x variable) as the independent variable. 
 
The Multiple R of 0.649 suggests a moderate to strong positive correlation, r2 equals 42.1% 
indicating a very strong explanation of the percentage variation in CC that can be attributed to TSR 
and the p-value of 0.236 is considerably > than 0.05 suggesting the null hypothesis fails to be 
rejected, based on a test at the 5% level of significance. 
 
4.2.6. Split periods: Period 1 (2004 to 2008) – Bottom CGI 19 Companies 
 
The outputs presented in Table 4.2.6 results from using CC (y variable) as the dependent variable 
and TSR (x variable) as the independent variable. 
 
The Multiple R of 0.424 suggests a moderate positive correlation, r2 equals 18.0% indicating a weak 
explanation of the percentage variation in CC that can be attributed to TSR and the p-value of 0.476 
is considerably > than 0.05 suggesting the null hypothesis fails to be rejected, based on a test at the 
5% level of significance. 
 
4.2.7. Split periods: Period 2 (2009 to 2013) – Total sample 
 
The outputs presented in Table 4.2.7 results from using CC (y variable) as the dependent variable 
and TSR (x variable) as the independent variable. 
 
The Multiple R of 0.514 suggests a weak positive correlation, with an r2 of 26.4% indicating a weak 
explanation of the percentage variation in CC that can be attributed to TSR and the p-value of 0.376 
is considerably > than 0.05 suggesting the null hypothesis fails to be rejected, based on a test at the 
5% level of significance. 
 
 
 
 
Page | 44  
 
4.2.8. Split periods: Period 2 (2009 to 2013) – Top CGI 19 Companies 
 
The outputs presented in Table 4.2.8 results from using CC (y variable) as the dependent variable 
and TSR (x variable) as the independent variable. 
 
The Multiple R of 0.584 suggests a moderate positive correlation, r2 of 34.1% indicating a weak 
explanation of the percentage variation in CC that can be attributed to TSR and the p-value of 0.301 
is considerably > than 0.05 suggesting the null hypothesis fails to be rejected, based on a test at the 
5% level of significance. 
 
4.2.9. Split periods: Period 2 (2009 to 2013) – Bottom CGI 19 Companies 
 
The outputs presented in Table 4.2.9 results from using CC (y variable) as the dependent variable 
and TSR (x variable) as the independent variable. 
 
The Multiple R of 0.407 suggests a moderate positive correlation, r2 squared equals 16.5% 
indicating a weak explanation of the percentage variation in CC that can be attributed to TSR and 
the p-value of 0.497 is considerably > than 0.05 suggesting the null hypothesis fails to be rejected, 
based on a test at the 5% level of significance. 
 
4.3. TSR and CC: Lagged basis - Regression and correlation analysis 
 
4.3.1. Total sample 
 
The outputs presented in Table 4.3.1 results from using CC (y variable) as the dependent variable 
and TSR (x variable) as the independent variable. 
 
The Multiple R of 0.705 suggests a strong positive correlation, r2 equals 49.7% indicating a 
moderate explanation of the percentage variation in CC that can be attributed to TSR and the p-
value of 0.034 is < than 0.05 suggesting the null hypothesis should be rejected, based on a test at 
the 5% level of significance. 
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4.3.2. Top CGI 19 Companies 
 
The outputs presented in Table 4.3.2 results from using CC (y variable) as the dependent variable 
and TSR (x variable) as the independent variable. 
 
The Multiple R of 0.345 suggests a weak to moderate positive correlation, r2 equals 11.9% 
indicating a weak explanation of the percentage variation in CC that can be attributed to TSR and 
the p-value of 0.363 is considerably > than 0.05 suggesting the null hypothesis fails to be rejected, 
based on a test at the 5% level of significance. 
 
4.3.3. Bottom CGI 19 Companies 
 
The outputs presented in Table 4.3.3 results from using CC (y variable) as the dependent variable 
and TSR (x variable) as the independent variable. 
 
The Multiple R of 0.765 suggests a strong positive correlation, r2 equals 58.6% indicating a 
moderate explanation of the percentage variation in CC that can be attributed TSR and the p-value 
of 0.016 is < than 0.05 suggesting the null hypothesis should be rejected, based on a test at the 5% 
level of significance. 
 
4.3.4. Split periods: Period 1 (2004 to 2008) – Total sample 
 
The outputs presented in Table 4.3.4 results from using CC (y variable) as the dependent variable 
and TSR (x variable) as the independent variable. 
 
The Multiple R of 0.933 suggests a very strong positive correlation, r2 equals 87.1% indicating a 
very strong explanation of the percentage variation in CC that can be attributed to TSR and the p-
value of 0.021 is < than 0.05 suggesting the null hypothesis should be rejected, based on a test at 
the 5% level of significance. 
 
4.3.5. Split periods: Period 1 (2004 to 2008) – Top CGI 19 Companies 
 
The outputs presented in Table 4.3.5 results from using CC (y variable) as the dependent variable 
and TSR (x variable) as the independent variable. 
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The Multiple R of 0.50 suggests a weak positive correlation, r2 equals 25.0% indicating a weak 
explanation of the percentage variation in CC that can be attributed to TSR and the p-value of 0.391 
is considerably > than 0.05 suggesting the null hypothesis fails to be rejected, based on a test at the 
5% level of significance. 
 
4.3.6. Split periods: Period 1 (2004 to 2008) – Bottom CGI 19 Companies 
 
The outputs presented in Table 4.3.6 results from using CC (y variable) as the dependent variable 
and TSR (x variable) as the independent variable. 
 
The Multiple R of 0.924 suggests a strong, near perfect correlation, r2 equals 85.3% indicating a 
strong to perfect explanation of the percentage variation in CC that can be attributed to TSR and 
the p-value of 0.025 is < than 0.05 suggesting the null hypothesis should be rejected, based on a 
test at the 5% level of significance. 
 
4.3.7. Split periods: Period 2 (2008 to 2012) – Total sample 
 
The outputs presented in Table 4.3.7 results from using CC (y variable) as the dependent variable 
and TSR (x variable) as the independent variable. 
 
The Multiple R of 0.585 suggests a weak positive correlation, r2 equals 34.2% indicating a weak 
explanation of the percentage variation in CC that can be attributed to TSR and the p-value of 0.301 
is considerably > than 0.05 suggesting the null hypothesis fails to be rejected, based on a test at the 
5% level of significance. 
 
4.3.8. Split periods: Period 2 (2008 to 2012) – Top CGI 19 Companies 
 
The outputs presented in Table 4.3.8 results from using CC (y variable) as the dependent variable 
and TSR (x variable) as the independent variable. 
 
The Multiple R of 0.235 suggests a weak positive correlation, r2 equals 5.5% indicating a weak to 
no explanation of the percentage variation in CC that can be attributed to TSR and the p-value of 
0.703 is considerably > than 0.05 suggesting the null hypothesis fails to be rejected, based on a test 
at the 5% level of significance. 
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4.3.9. Split periods: Period 2 (2008 to 2012) – Bottom CGI 19 Companies 
 
The outputs presented in Table 4.3.9 results from using CC (y variable) as the dependent variable 
and TSR (x variable) as the independent variable. 
 
The Multiple R of 0.829 suggests a very strong positive correlation, r2 equals 68.7% indicating a 
moderate explanation of the percentage variation in CC that can be attributed to TSR and the p-
value of 0.083 is > than 0.05 suggesting the null hypothesis fails to be rejected based on a test at 
the 5% level of significance. 
 
4.4. Summary of results 
 
4.4.1. Year for year basis 
 
CEO compensation (CC) applied on a “year for year” basis for the total sample results in a weak 
TSR and CC alignment and produces similar results for the bottom 19 CGI ranked companies. 
However, when applied to the top 19 CGI ranked companies, a moderate to positive significant 
TSR and CC relationship is observed. 
 
The “year for year” basis period analysis, 2004 to 2013, for the total sample presents a moderate 
TSR and CC relationship in the first 5 years (2004 to 2008) and a similar, though weaker, 
relationship in the last 5 years (2009 to 2013). 
 
For the period analysis, 2004 to 2013, when applied to the higher CGI ranked companies, similar 
results are found, namely, a stronger relationship is observed in the first period than that in the 
second period. The bottom CGI ranked companies’ results reflect moderate positive relationships 
for both periods. 
 
4.4.2. Lagged basis 
 
CEO compensation (CC) applied retrospectively (lagged), results in a strong significant TSR and 
CC relationship. This applies to the total sample and the bottom 19 CGI ranked companies. 
However, the top 19 companies reflect a weak positive alignment. 
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The “lagged” basis period analysis for the total sample presents a very strong, significant 
relationship between TSR and CC in the first 5 years (2004 to 2008) and a weaker relationship in 
the last 5 years (2008 to 2012). 
 
The top ranked CGI companies’ results are similar, but reflect a weak relationship in the first period 
and an even weaker association in the last 5 years. 
 
The results of the bottom CGI ranked companies present a near perfect relationship in the first 
period and a slightly weaker, yet very strong relationship in the second period. 
 
4.4.3. Corporate governance 
 
The strength of corporate governance in respect of the total sample, for both the “year to year” and 
“lagged” basis, suggest an overall weakening over the latter part of the period (2008 to 2012/3). 
 
The top 19 CGI ranked companies findings emulate the total sample’s results, namely, a weakening 
of corporate governance for the last period. 
 
For the bottom CGI ranked companies, strong and consistent corporate governance is observed for 
the whole period, given the findings of the TSR and CC relationships in both the year for year and 
lagged basis analysis. 
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TSR CC
2004 46.98% 28.36%
2005 67.68% 18.88%
2006 64.73% 41.13%
2007 41.44% 27.59%
2008 -5.98% 12.25%
2009 3.28% -3.33%
2010 36.38% 24.85%
2011 14.54% 32.21%
2012 17.92% -3.27%
2013 16.50% 10.15%
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics Interpretation
Multiple R 0.62242444 Moderate positive
R Square 0.387412184 Weak
Adj. R Square 0.310838706
Standard Error 0.123082476
Observations 10
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.076645622 0.076645622 5.05935212 0.054626913 p-value > 0.05 therefore ??? H0 (borderline)
Residual 8 0.121194366 0.015149296
Total 9 0.197839988
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.07717478 0.06308408 1.223363805 0.256001454 -0.068297369 0.222646929 -0.068297369 0.222646929
TSR 0.367986861 0.163600588 2.249300362 0.054626913 -0.009276771 0.745250494 -0.009276771 0.745250494
Table 4.2.1. All: Results Statistical Analysis - Simple Linear Regression TSR (x variable) CC (y variable)
Interpretation
-10.00%
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
80.00%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
All: TSR and CC
TSR CC
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TSR CC
2004 51.36% 39.25%
2005 40.20% 19.49%
2006 65.90% 40.60%
2007 39.38% 16.36%
2008 -8.78% 19.51%
2009 1.78% 2.10%
2010 35.49% 34.56%
2011 10.33% 23.77%
2012 16.95% -8.87%
2013 13.14% 8.73%
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics Interpretation
Multiple R 0.64510723 Moderate to strong positive
R Square 0.416163338 Weak to moderate
Adj. R Square 0.343183755
Standard Error 0.129931769
Observations 10
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.096270482 0.096270482 5.702462547 0.043994109 p-value < 0.05 therefore reject H0
Residual 8 0.135058117 0.016882265
Total 9 0.231328599
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.078796366 0.0638516 1.234054685 0.25220335 -0.068445687 0.226038419 -0.068445687 0.226038419
TSR 0.439169106 0.183907974 2.387982945 0.043994109 0.015076557 0.863261655 0.015076557 0.863261655
Table 4.2.2. Top CGI 19 Companies. Results Statistical Analysis - Simple Linear Regression TSR (x variable) CC (y variable)
Interpretation
-20.00%
-10.00%
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Top CGI 19 Companies: TSR and CC
TSR CC
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TSR CC
2004 42.59% 17.47%
2005 95.15% 18.28%
2006 63.56% 41.67%
2007 43.50% 38.81%
2008 -3.18% 5.00%
2009 4.77% -8.77%
2010 37.27% 15.15%
2011 18.75% 40.66%
2012 18.89% 2.33%
2013 19.86% 11.57%
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics Interpretation
Multiple R 0.472753415 Weak positive
R Square 0.223495791 Weak
Adj. R Square 0.126432765
Standard Error 0.161500536
Observations 10
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.060056975 0.060056975 2.302584208 0.167635279 p-value > 0.05 therefore accept H0
Residual 8 0.208659385 0.026082423
Total 9 0.26871636
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.086809017 0.080981421 1.071962132 0.31500671 -0.099934475 0.273552508 -0.099934475 0.273552508
TSR 0.279541468 0.184220722 1.517426838 0.167635279 -0.145272279 0.704355215 -0.145272279 0.704355215
Table 4.2.3. Bottom CGI 19 companies. Results Statistical Analysis - Simple Linear Regression TSR (x variable) CC (y variable)
Interpretation
-20.00%
0.00%
20.00%
40.00%
60.00%
80.00%
100.00%
120.00%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Bottom CGI 19 Companies: TSR and CC
TSR CC
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TSR CC
2004 46.98% 28.36%
2005 67.68% 18.88%
2006 64.73% 41.13%
2007 41.44% 27.59%
2008 -5.98% 12.25%
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics Interpretation
Multiple R 0.645770852 Moderate positive
R Square 0.417019993 Weak
Adj. R Square 0.222693324
Standard Error 0.096180777
Observations 5
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.019851852 0.019851852 2.145974072 0.239176549 p-value > 0.05 therefore accept H0
Residual 3 0.027752226 0.009250742
Total 4 0.047604078
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.154082275 0.082052103 1.877858937 0.157027242 -0.107044137 0.415208687 -0.107044137 0.415208687
TSR 0.238218735 0.162616152 1.464914356 0.239176549 -0.279298436 0.755735906 -0.279298436 0.755735906
Table 4.2.4. All: Period 2004 to 2008. Results Statistical Analysis - Simple Linear Regression TSR (x variable) and CC (y variable)
Interpretation
-10.00%
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
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50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
80.00%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
All: Period 2004 to 2008 TSR and CC
TSR CC
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TSR CC
2004 51.36% 39.25%
2005 40.20% 19.49%
2006 65.90% 40.60%
2007 39.38% 16.36%
2008 -8.78% 19.51%
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics Interpretation
Multiple R 0.648707258 Moderate to strong positive
R Square 0.420821107 Weak to moderate
Adj. R Square 0.227761475
Standard Error 0.104027476
Observations 5
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.0235886 0.0235886 2.179746766 0.236326553 p-value > 0.05 therefore accept H0
Residual 3 0.032465147 0.010821716
Total 4 0.056053747
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.167509943 0.083804139 1.998826601 0.139484506 -0.099192231 0.434212116 -0.099192231 0.434212116
TSR 0.273604254 0.185318947 1.476396548 0.236326553 -0.316163345 0.863371853 -0.316163345 0.863371853
Table 4.2.5. Top 19 CGI Companies: Period 2004 to 2008. Results Statistical Analysis - Simple Linear Regression TSR (x variable) and CC (y variable)
Interpretation
-20.00%
-10.00%
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TSR CC
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TSR CC
2004 42.59% 17.47%
2005 95.15% 18.28%
2006 63.56% 41.67%
2007 43.50% 38.81%
2008 -3.18% 5.00%
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics Interpretation
Multiple R 0.424439385 Moderate positive
R Square 0.180148792 Weak
Adj. R Square -0.093134944
Standard Error 0.162630675
Observations 5
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.017435022 0.017435022 0.659200559 0.476282209 p-value > 0.05 therefore accept H0
Residual 3 0.079346209 0.026448736
Total 4 0.096781231
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.153406417 0.131608306 1.165628682 0.328013473 -0.265429952 0.572242785 -0.265429952 0.572242785
TSR 0.184287859 0.226980183 0.81191167 0.476282209 -0.538064385 0.906640103 -0.538064385 0.906640103
Table 4.2.6. Bottom 19 CGI Companies: Period 2004 to 2008. Results Statistical Analysis - Simple Linear Regression TSR (x variable) and CC (y variable)
Interpretation
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Bottom 19 CGI Ranked Companies: Period 2004 to 2008 TSR and CC
TSR CC
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TSR CC
2009 3.28% -3.33%
2010 36.38% 24.85%
2011 14.54% 32.21%
2012 17.92% -3.27%
2013 16.50% 10.15%
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics Interpretation
Multiple R 0.513944004 Moderate positive
R Square 0.264138439 Weak
Adj. R Square 0.018851252
Standard Error 0.160131305
Observations 5
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.027612723 0.027612723 1.0768538 0.375699111 p-value > 0.05 therefore accept H0
Residual 3 0.076926104 0.025642035
Total 4 0.104538827
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.002282128 0.138916591 -0.016428044 0.987924383 -0.444376721 0.439812465 -0.444376721 0.439812465
TSR 0.69700319 0.671670684 1.037715665 0.375699111 -1.440552697 2.834559078 -1.440552697 2.834559078
Table 4.2.7. All: Period 2009 to 2013. Results Statistical Analysis - Simple Linear Regression TSR (x variable) and CC (y variable)
Interpretation
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TSR CC
2009 1.78% 2.10%
2010 35.49% 34.56%
2011 10.33% 23.77%
2012 16.95% -8.87%
2013 13.14% 8.73%
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics Interpretation
Multiple R 0.58433293 Moderate positive
R Square 0.341444974 Weak
Adj. R Square 0.121926632
Standard Error 0.161731232
Observations 5
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.040685317 0.040685317 1.55542799 0.300830946 p-value > 0.05 therefore accept H0
Residual 3 0.078470975 0.026156992
Total 4 0.119156291
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.005057321 0.124025794 -0.040776363 0.970036154 -0.39976275 0.389648109 -0.39976275 0.389648109
TSR 0.808671954 0.648406599 1.247167988 0.300830946 -1.254847233 2.87219114 -1.254847233 2.87219114
Table 4.2.8. Top 19 CGI Companies: Period 2009 to 2013. Results Statistical Analysis - Simple Linear Regression TSR (x variable) and CC (y variable)
Interpretation
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TSR CC
2009 4.77% -8.77%
2010 37.27% 15.15%
2011 18.75% 40.66%
2012 18.89% 2.33%
2013 19.86% 11.57%
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics Interpretation
Multiple R 0.406731065 Moderate positive
R Square 0.165430159 Weak
Adj. R Square -0.112759788
Standard Error 0.194215803
Observations 5
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.022430677 0.022430677 0.594666201 0.496789477 p-value > 0.05 therefore accept H0
Residual 3 0.113159334 0.037719778
Total 4 0.135590011
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.007264493 0.188663356 -0.038505058 0.971704054 -0.607675493 0.593146506 -0.607675493 0.593146506
TSR 0.648806944 0.84135419 0.771146031 0.496789477 -2.028757589 3.326371477 -2.028757589 3.326371477
Table 4.2.9. Bottom 19 CGI Ranked Companies: Period 2009 to 2012. Results Statistical Analysis - Simple Linear Regression TSR (x variable) and CC (y variable)
Interpretation
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TSR CC (Lagged)
2004 46.98% 18.88%
2005 67.68% 41.13%
2006 64.73% 27.59%
2007 41.44% 12.25%
2008 -5.98% -3.33%
2009 3.28% 24.85%
2010 36.38% 32.21%
2011 14.54% -3.27%
2012 17.92% 10.15%
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics Interpretation
Multiple R 0.705017944 Strong positive
R Square 0.497050301 Moderate
Adj. R Square 0.425200344
Standard Error 0.11617977
Observations 9
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.093375911 0.093375911 6.917892821 0.033903312
Residual 7 0.094484172 0.013497739
Total 8 0.187860083
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.046301052 0.06339442 0.730364778 0.488884225 -0.103602932 0.196205036 -0.103602932 0.196205036
TSR 0.414034648 0.157416326 2.630188742 0.033903312 0.041804186 0.78626511 0.041804186 0.78626511
Table 4.3.1. All: Results Statistical Analysis - Simple Linear Regression TSR (x variable) and CC Lagged (y variable)
Interpretation
p-value < 0.05 therefore reject H0
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TSR CC (Lagged)
2004 51.36% 19.49%
2005 40.20% 40.60%
2006 65.90% 16.36%
2007 39.38% 19.51%
2008 -8.78% 2.10%
2009 1.78% 34.56%
2010 35.49% 23.77%
2011 10.33% -8.87%
2012 16.95% 8.73%
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics Interpretation
Multiple R 0.345309553 Weak positive
R Square 0.119238687 Weak to none
Adj. R Square -0.006584357
Standard Error 0.153887167
Observations 9
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.022442013 0.022442013 0.947669703 0.362743992
Residual 7 0.16576882 0.02368126
Total 8 0.188210833
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.112871721 0.08078132 1.397250278 0.205031123 -0.078145746 0.303889189 -0.078145746 0.303889189
TSR 0.216432414 0.222327818 0.973483283 0.362743992 -0.309289335 0.742154163 -0.309289335 0.742154163
Table 4.3.2. Top 19 CGI Companies. Results Statistical Analysis - Simple Linear Regression TSR (x variable) CC Lagged (y variable)
Interpretation
p-value > 0.05 therefore accept H0
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Top 19 CGI Companies: TSR and CC Lagged
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TSR CC (Lagged)
2004 42.59% 18.28%
2005 95.15% 41.67%
2006 63.56% 38.81%
2007 43.50% 5.00%
2008 -3.18% -8.77%
2009 4.77% 15.15%
2010 37.27% 40.66%
2011 18.75% 2.33%
2012 18.89% 11.57%
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics Interpretation
Multiple R 0.765202918 Strong positive
R Square 0.585535505 Moderate
Adj. R Square 0.526326291
Standard Error 0.126122308
Observations 9
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.157306895 0.157306895 9.88926334 0.016271566
Residual 7 0.111347855 0.015906836
Total 8 0.26865475
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.019066322 0.06697026 0.284698342 0.78411368 -0.139293179 0.177425823 -0.139293179 0.177425823
TSR 0.45921426 0.146027078 3.144719914 0.016271566 0.11391509 0.80451343 0.11391509 0.80451343
Table 4.3.3. Bottom 19 CGI Companies. Results Statistical Analysis - Simple Linear Regression TSR (x variable) CC Lagged (y variable)
Interpretation
p-value < 0.05 therefore reject H0
-20.00%
0.00%
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40.00%
60.00%
80.00%
100.00%
120.00%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Bottom 19 CGI Companies: TSR and CC Lagged
TSR CC (Lagged)
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TSR CC (Lagged)
2004 46.98% 18.88%
2005 67.68% 41.13%
2006 64.73% 27.59%
2007 41.44% 12.25%
2008 -5.98% -3.33%
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics Interpretation
Multiple R 0.93315136 Very strong positive
R Square 0.870771461 Very strong
Adj. R Square 0.827695282
Standard Error 0.069065493
Observations 5
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.09642491 0.09642491 20.21468638 0.020538529
Residual 3 0.014310127 0.004770042
Total 4 0.110735037
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.0325354 0.058919974 -0.552196434 0.619288504 -0.220045055 0.154974255 -0.220045055 0.154974255
TSR 0.525012951 0.116771407 4.496074552 0.020538529 0.153394218 0.896631683 0.153394218 0.896631683
Table 4.3.4. All: Period 2004 to 2008. Results Statistical Analysis - Simple Linear Regression TSR (x variable) and CC Lagged (y variable)
Interpretation
p-value < 0.05 therefore reject H0
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50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
80.00%
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All: Period 2004 to 2008 TSR and CC (Lagged)
TSR CC (Lagged)
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TSR CC (Lagged)
2004 51.36% 19.49%
2005 40.20% 40.60%
2006 65.90% 16.36%
2007 39.38% 19.51%
2008 -8.78% 2.10%
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics Interpretation
Multiple R 0.500169315 Weak positive
R Square 0.250169344 Weak 
Adj. R Square 0.000225792
Standard Error 0.137593836
Observations 5
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.018949166 0.018949166 1.000903372 0.390815533
Residual 3 0.056796191 0.018932064
Total 4 0.075745357
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.103891211 0.110845071 0.937265049 0.417764694 -0.248867277 0.456649699 -0.248867277 0.456649699
TSR 0.245226172 0.245115482 1.000451584 0.390815533 -0.534840687 1.02529303 -0.534840687 1.02529303
Table 4.3.5. Top 19 CGI Companies: Period 2004 to 2008. Results Statistical Analysis - Simple Linear Regression TSR (x variable) and CC Lagged (y variable)
Interpretation
p-value > 0.05 therefore accept H0
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TSR CC (Lagged)
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TSR CC (Lagged)
2004 42.59% 18.28%
2005 95.15% 41.67%
2006 63.56% 38.81%
2007 43.50% 5.00%
2008 -3.18% -8.77%
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics Interpretation
Multiple R 0.923738774 Near perfect positive
R Square 0.853293322 Strong to perfect
Adj. R Square 0.804391096
Standard Error 0.095732039
Observations 5
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.159913209 0.159913209 17.44896689 0.024989536
Residual 3 0.02749387 0.009164623
Total 4 0.187407079
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.079722974 0.077470819 -1.029071013 0.379155315 -0.326269695 0.166823747 -0.326269695 0.166823747
TSR 0.558120079 0.133611176 4.177196056 0.024989536 0.132909684 0.983330473 0.132909684 0.983330473
Table 4.3.6. Bottom 19 CGI Companies: Period 2004 to 2008. Results Statistical Analysis - Simple Linear Regression TSR (x variable) and CC Lagged (y variable)
Interpretation
p-value < 0.05 therefore reject H0
-20.00%
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100.00%
120.00%
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Bottom 19 CGI Companies: Period 2004 to 2008 TSR and CC (Lagged)
TSR CC (Lagged)
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TSR CC (Lagged)
2008 -5.98% -3.33%
2009 3.28% 24.85%
2010 36.38% 32.21%
2011 14.54% -3.27%
2012 17.92% 10.15%
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics Interpretation
Multiple R 0.584520385 Weak positive
R Square 0.34166408 Weak
Adj. R Square 0.122218774
Standard Error 0.151461398
Observations 5
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.035717162 0.035717162 1.556944123 0.300637275
Residual 3 0.068821665 0.022940555
Total 4 0.104538827
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.043261602 0.09216221 0.46940717 0.67078848 -0.250039683 0.336562887 -0.250039683 0.336562887
TSR 0.589568908 0.472495916 1.24777567 0.300637275 -0.914123974 2.093261791 -0.914123974 2.093261791
Table 4.3.7. All: Period 2008 to 2012. Results Statistical Analysis - Simple Linear Regression TSR (x variable) and CC Lagged (y variable)
Interpretation
p-value > 0.05 therefore accept H0
-10.00%
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All: Period 2008 to 2012 TSR and CC (Lagged)
TSR CC (Lagged)
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TSR CC (Lagged)
2008 -8.78% 2.10%
2009 1.78% 34.56%
2010 35.49% 23.77%
2011 10.33% -8.87%
2012 16.95% 8.73%
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics Interpretation
Multiple R 0.235084648 Weak positive
R Square 0.055264792 Near none
Adj. R Square -0.259646944
Standard Error 0.193710388
Observations 5
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.006585148 0.006585148 0.175492957 0.703461215
Residual 3 0.112571144 0.037523715
Total 4 0.119156291
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.093446091 0.108191928 0.863706679 0.451276909 -0.250868911 0.437761093 -0.250868911 0.437761093
TSR 0.243399418 0.581018136 0.418918795 0.703461215 -1.605659603 2.092458439 -1.605659603 2.092458439
Table 4.3.8. Top 19 CGI Companies: Period 2008 to 2012. Results Statistical Analysis - Simple Linear Regression TSR (x variable) and CC Lagged (y variable)
Interpretation
p-value > 0.05 therefore accept H0
-15.00%
-10.00%
-5.00%
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
40.00%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Top 19 CGI Companies: Period 2008 to 2012: TSR and CC (Lagged)
TSR CC (Lagged)
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TSR CC (Lagged)
2008 -3.18% -8.77%
2009 4.77% 15.15%
2010 37.27% 40.66%
2011 18.75% 2.33%
2012 18.89% 11.57%
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics Interpretation
Multiple R 0.828637633 Very strong positive
R Square 0.686640327 Moderate
Adjusted R Square 0.582187103
Standard Error 0.119007621
Observations 5
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.09310157 0.09310157 6.573663306 0.082930893
Residual 3 0.042488442 0.014162814
Total 4 0.135590011
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.028794321 0.079287548 -0.363163222 0.740563931 -0.281122685 0.223534042 -0.281122685 0.223534042
TSR 0.984947747 0.384157629 2.56391562 0.082930893 -0.237613282 2.207508775 -0.237613282 2.207508775
Table 4.3.9. Bottom 19 CGI Companies: Period 2008 to 2012. Results Statistical Analysis - Simple Linear Regression TSR (x variable) and CC Lagged (y variable)
Interpretation
p-value > 0.05 therefore accept H0
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Bottom 19 CGI Companies: Period 2008 to 2012: TSR and CC (Lagged)
TSR CC (Lagged)
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CHAPTER 5 – Discussion 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 1 outlined the initial purpose of the research, which was to: 
• Examine the factors that determine and/or shape the relationship between the Chief Executive 
Officer’s (CEO’s) compensation and the wealth created for shareholders. 
• Establish the corporate governance elements, systems and processes that assist in monitoring the 
CEO’s remuneration and performance contract. 
• Measure the effectiveness of South African listed companies’ adherence to corporate governance 
measures in addressing the agency problem. 
 
This research aimed to establish whether there was an alignment between the CEO compensation 
and the shareholder value relationship and additionally, whether corporate governance 
interventions influenced this relationship. 
 
The resulting null hypothesis (H0) stated that: 
H0: Poor corporate governance prevails in South African listed companies resulting in CEO 
compensation not being aligned to shareholder wealth creation. 
 
The review of the literature, Chapter 2, provided the understanding which aided with the research 
methods described in Chapter 3 and the statistical analysis detailed in Chapter 4. 
 
The purpose of the analysis was to measure the correlation and find the significance of the 
relationships that exist between: 
• The annual percentage increase in CEO compensation (CC). 
• The annual percentage value created for shareholders by using total shareholder returns (TSR) 
as a proxy. 
• The annual percentage change of corporate governance control measures, by using a four 
component corporate governance index (CGI). This was then ranked per company CGI scores, 
which then provided two distinct CGI strength groups, namely, the top and bottom CGI ranked 
companies. 
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5.2. Summary of findings 
 
5.2.1. Total sample - CC and TSR relationship 
 
The results for the sample reveals a strong positive and significant relationship when CC is applied 
retrospectively (lagged) for the period 2004 to 2012. The period analysis, with CC lagged, reflects 
a very strong positive and significant relationship in the first 5 years (2004 to 2008) and a markedly 
weak positive and insignificant relationship in the last period (2008 to 2012). 
 
The findings confirm a strong and significant alignment between CC and TSR, with a weakening 
of corporate governance observed in the latter period. 
 
5.2.2. Top CGI ranked companies - CC and TSR relationship 
 
The top CGI ranked companies results, applied on a year for year basis, display a moderate to strong 
positive and significant relationship. However, for the first period analysis (2004 to 2008), although 
a moderate to strong positive relationship is found, it is observed as being insignificant. The latter 
period, 2009 to 2013, displays an even weaker and more insignificant association. When CC is 
lagged, the top CGI ranked companies results are weak and insignificant. 
 
The full period, year to year basis results, suggest CC is aligned with TSR and that the higher 
corporate governance ranked companies are conceivably designing CEO compensation packages 
that aligns the executive’s interest with that of the shareholders on a year for year basis and are not 
rewarding (or penalising) CEO’s retrospectively. 
 
For the seemingly top CGI ranked companies, surprisingly, the period analysis results reflect 
consistent, weak observations for both periods  
 
5.2.3. Bottom CGI ranked companies - CC and TSR relationship 
 
The bottom CGI ranked companies’ results mirror those of the total sample when lagged, displaying 
a strong and significant relationship. The period analysis reveal a near perfect positive and very 
significant association in the first period (2004 to 2008) and less strong yet still significant 
relationship in the period 2008 to 2012. 
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These findings suggest CEO compensation is aligned to total shareholder returns and that 
companies with supposedly weaker corporate governance structures have designed CEO 
compensation packages that rewards (or penalises) the CEO for shareholder value created the 
previous year. 
 
Further, the purportedly bottom CGI ranked companies display the more consistent alignment 
between CC and TSR over both the total period and for the first and second period analysis.  
 
5.2.4. Corporate governance effects 
 
The previous summary of the results (point 5.2 above), finds a stronger association for the lower 
CGI ranked companies between CC and TSR which suggest that the governance components of the 
index, namely, board chairperson independence, non-executive director majority and independence 
and strong institutional shareholding did not play a prominent role in influencing the CEO 
compensation and shareholder wealth creation relationship. 
 
On the contrary, it appears that companies with higher corporate governance ratings have less of an 
alignment between the CC and TSR relationship. This suggests that the governance measures 
advocated to alleviate the principal-agent problem are futile. 
 
In order to obtain a better understanding of the results, the CGI measures for the period of the study 
were tabulated (see Table 5.2.4; below). 
 
 
 
The values, which include CC for the period, are depicted in Figure 4, below. 
 
YEAR 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
CC 28.36% 18.88% 41.13% 27.59% 12.25% -3.33% 24.85% 32.21% -3.27% 10.15%
CGI Score 10% 20% 50% 50% 50% 100% 70% 70% 80% 90%
CGI % (x10) 0.00% 25.00% 16.26% 0.00% 0.00% 48.00% -30.53% 0.00% 7.87% 15.63%
TABLE 5.2.4.
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(Note: Mean % change is multiplied by 10 for an improved graphical presentation) 
 
For the period 2004 to 2013, conflicting results for corporate governance strength are observed on 
the line chart. There is a suggestion of a strengthening of governance, if annual CGI indicators are 
scored and ranked, but it appears that corporate governance remains virtually static if the annual 
mean percentage change is applied. 
 
An explanation for the weakening of the relationship in the second period could be due to the basic 
salary component of CEO compensation not necessarily decreasing in times of economic turmoil, 
for which the year 2008 is an example. The CC results on the above chart, reflect a reduction in 
CEO compensation from 2006 to 2009, which suggests a decrease in annual bonuses with the basic 
salary possibly decreasing or remaining fixed. 
 
5.3. Comparison to similar studies 
 
5.3.1. Studies in support of the governance, CEO and shareholder relationships 
 
The earlier Baysinger and Butler (1985:120) study on US companies’ report that more independent 
boards realise measurable performance dividends for the period 1970 to 1980. This is echoed in the 
Core et al (1999:403) research which finds a decrease in CEO compensation (CC) in boards with 
more independent directors (non-executive directors). The authors also report CC decreasing when 
Figure 4. CC, CGI ranked scores and CGI%  change (x10)
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there is an institutional shareholder and note that CC increases if the CEO is also the chairman of 
the board. 
 
Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian (2008:372) questions whether the impact of governance structures 
and incentive-based compensation on firm performance measures up when performance is adjusted 
for the effects of earnings management and finds that CC is lower when stronger institutional 
ownership and more independent directors are observed. However, the authors also find that firms’ 
earnings increase with more independent directors. The examination by Hartzell and Starks 
(2003:2372) affirms that stronger institutional ownership positively influences CC which they 
imply mitigates the agency problem. 
 
The Gompers et al (2003:144) analysis finds stronger correlation between corporate governance 
and TSR in the 1990’s for US firms. A test on companies using the corporate governance index 
(CGI) created by Gompers et al (2003), Varshney et al (2012:2) describe finding a positive 
relationship between their CGI and firm performance when EVA is used as a proxy for the firm’s 
performance. Research by Larcker et al (2007:963) is less convincing and asserts that the CGI only 
has some ability to explain future operating performance and excess TSR. An article by Abowd 
(1990:68-S), suggest that pay for performance systems based on after gross economic return and 
TSR may be effective. 
 
South African research reporting on CC and company performance relationship, include a study by 
De Wet (2012:76) which reveal a significant relationship between CC and the company 
performance measures, ROA and ROE with even stronger relationships observed if EVA and MVA 
is used as a measure for company performance. The Scholtz and Smit (2012) research informs that 
company performance variables explain less of the variation in CC during the 2008 financial crisis 
for SA Alternative Exchange (ALTX) companies but significantly strong relationships between CC 
and the company performance indicators total assets, turnover and share price. 
 
5.3.2. Studies rejecting the governance, CEO and shareholder relationships 
 
The Klein (1998) research found little association between firm performance and overall board 
structure thus supporting the study by Fama and Jensen (1983) that suggests inside (executive) 
directors provide valuable information. 
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The article by Coles et al (2001:43) which found no evidence nor any significant relationship 
between proportion of outside (independent) directors and CEO salary in relation to the 
performance measures EVA and MVA and that of Coombs and Gilley (2005:837) which observes 
negative correlation between the CEO’s salary and the variables of stakeholder management as a 
proxy for corporate governance and ROA which supports the findings of Murphy (1990). 
 
Black et al (2006:411) found that better corporate governance does not appear to predict higher 
firm profitability and that there is limited evidence to suggest that increasing the ratio of outside 
(independent) directors further increases share prices. A short study spanning two years by Ertugrul 
and Hegde (2009:157), suggest difficulty in establishing causality between governance ratings and 
firm performance. 
 
Lastly, in evaluating the ground-breaking Gompers et al (2003) research, a number of studies 
provide contrasting findings and these include research by: 
• Core et al (2006:656) who cannot find that weak corporate governance is the cause of poor 
shareholder returns. 
• Bebchuk et al (2009:783) suggesting that there is no correlation with stronger CGI ranked 
companies and future abnormal returns. 
• Johnson et al (2009:4753) finding that there is zero long term abnormal returns for portfolios 
sorted on CGI. 
• Bhagat and Bolton (2008:271) who observed that board independence is negatively correlated 
with current and subsequent operating performance. 
• Bhagat et al (2008:1869) who suggest that no one corporate governance index (CGI) can predict 
a firm’s performance. 
 
5.4. Potential shortcomings and improvements in respect of this study 
 
5.4.1. Corporate governance index (CGI) 
 
There is a need to enhance the CGI from a four component index to include more measurable 
interventions in order to create an improved proxy for corporate governance. By way of an example, 
this could emulate the CGI models employed by the reviewed researchers, such as Gompers et al 
(2003), which reflect elements of shareholder activism. 
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5.4.2. CEO compensation (CC) 
 
For CEO compensation, a method is required to include the cost of share options in the measure. 
Although a number of companies reflect the cost of options expensed on their income statements 
alongside the relevant executive’s remuneration in their annual reports, this is not applied or 
alternatively not consistently, applied by all listed companies. 
 
The binomial or the Black-Scholes-Merton method suggested by Ernst and Young (2014) in a 
publication on option-pricing models could be misleading as each company would have a different 
set of input values for certain components of the formula. The publication states that, as IFRS2 does 
not prescribe a specific option-pricing model, whichever method applied must take into account a 
minimum of six inputs, being: 
• Current price of the underlying share. 
• Exercise price of the option. 
• Expected volatility of the price of the underlying share. 
• Expected dividends on the underlying share. 
• Risk-free interest rate(s) for the expected term of the option. 
• Expected term of the option, taking into account both the contractual term of the option and the 
expected effects of employees’ exercise and post-vesting termination behaviour. 
 
It can be reasonably deduced that a number of the above inputs have values that could only be 
provided by the company and it would therefore not be feasible to attempt to calculate a company’s 
share option costs independently. 
 
5.5. Summary 
 
This study rejects the null hypothesis that CEO compensation is not aligned to shareholder returns, 
as the analysis confirms a strong positive and statistically significant relationship when CEO 
compensation is applied retrospectively. 
 
The research provides evidence of an improvement in the strength of corporate governance for the 
period 2004 to 2013. Yet, when observing the limited annual percentage improvement and 
considering the weaker second period association, it suggests that there is a weakening in corporate 
governance for South African listed companies. 
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However, the study finds that the corporate governance measures relating to institutional 
ownership, board composition and board independence have little, if no, influence on the CEO 
compensation and total shareholder return relationship. 
 
This result is contrary to the research conclusions drawn by: 
• Baysinger and Butler (1985), who find that more independent boards improve performance 
dividends. 
• The Core et al (1999) research which suggest a decrease in CEO compensation (CC) in boards 
with more independent director and state that CC decreases when there is an institutional 
shareholder. 
• The Hartzell and Starks (2003) research results proposing that stronger institutional ownership 
positively influences CC. 
• Gompers et al (2003) who find a stronger correlation between corporate governance and TSR 
• The Larcker et al (2007) results that less conclusively assert that a CGI only has some ability to 
explain future operating performance and excess TSR. 
• Cornett et al (2008), in observing that CC is lower when stronger institutional ownership and 
more independent directors are present. 
 
Research that concur with the study’s results, include: 
• The Klein (1998) research that found little association between firm performance and overall 
board structure. 
• Black et al (2006) who find that better corporate governance does not predict higher firm 
profitability and that there is little to suggest that an increase in the ratio of outside directors, 
increases share prices. 
• Core et al (2006) who find that weak corporate governance is not correlated to poor shareholder 
returns. 
• The Bhagat and Bolton (2008) investigation which affirms that board independence is negatively 
correlated with current and subsequent operating performance. 
• The Bebchuk et al (2009) study that finds that there is no correlation with stronger CGI ranked 
companies and future abnormal returns. 
• Bebchuk et al (2009:783) who suggest that there is no correlation with stronger CGI ranked 
companies and future abnormal returns. 
• Johnson et al (2009:4753) finding that there is no abnormal returns for portfolios sorted on CGI. 
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CHAPTER 6 - Conclusion 
 
The introduction, Chapter 1, highlighted the negative media headlines, research articles and reports 
suggesting, amongst other; 
• The abnormal growth in CEO compensation. 
• The alleged non-alignment of CEO remuneration to shareholder wealth creation. 
 
The results of this study submits that CEOs are remunerated in line with the value created for 
shareholders and it is observed that the annual percentage returns to shareholders is much greater 
than the annual percentage pay increases apportioned to CEOs. 
 
Additionally, the research attempted to establish whether companies with stronger corporate 
governance interventions resulted in a closer association between CEO compensation and TSR. 
 
The analysis of these results suggest that the corporate governance measures used in the corporate 
governance index, had virtually no influence on the CEO compensation and TSR relationship. 
 
Overall, the study provides inconsistent views on the influence of corporate governance, with some 
evidence of an improvement in the strength of corporate governance over the research period and 
conflicting suggestions of a weakening when observing the limited annual percentage improvement 
and when considering the weaker second period results. 
 
Further, it appears that the higher CGI ranked companies are designing CC packages that are 
aligned to TSR on a year to year basis, whereas the lower CGI ranked companies’ compensation 
packages give the impression that CEOs are rewarded (or penalised) retrospectively. 
 
The findings support and also contradict the results of a number of investigations conducted by 
researchers’ world-wide. 
 
The limitations of the study include; 
• The size of the sample. 
• The limited number of elements of the corporate governance index. 
• The exclusion of long term incentives as part of CEO compensation. 
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Notwithstanding the above, the results of the research provide weighty evidence of a strong positive 
alignment between CEO compensation and total shareholder return, thereby refuting popular belief. 
 
Potential areas for future research could include; 
• An enhancement of the quality and number of elements in the CGI to provide an improved 
proxy for corporate governance. 
• A larger sample subset as part of a longer period, longitudinal cohort study. 
• A study that attempts to establish the corporate governance measures prevalent in companies 
that provide superior returns to shareholders. 
• An improvement of the CEO compensation measure that includes the cost of share options. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AFE AECI Limited 16,030,142,500                   Pre 2003 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil
ABL African Bank Inv Ltd 18,088,173,422                   Liquidated Nil 2003 to 2005 & 2011 2003 to 2005 & 2011 to 2013 2003 to 2005 & 2011 2003 to 2011 & 2013 Nil
AVI AVI Ltd 19,792,564,933                   Pre 2003 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil
BGA Barclays Africa Grp Ltd 112,115,027,298                 Pre 2003 Nil Nil Nil Nil 2005 to 2008 Nil
BTI British American Tob plc 1,135,076,441,133              Pre 2003 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 2003 to 2007
CML Coronation Fund Mngrs Ld 27,969,936,196                   Pre 2003 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil
DTC Datatec Ltd 10,210,019,656                   Pre 2003 Nil Nil Nil Nil 2003 to 2013 Nil
DST Distell Group Ltd 30,155,797,424                   Pre 2003 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil
FSR Firstrand Ltd 202,345,727,218                 Pre 2003 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil
GND Grindrod Ltd 16,839,451,751                   Pre 2003 Nil 2003 2003 2003 2003 Nil
GRT Growthpoint Prop Ltd 47,005,234,789                   Pre 2003 Nil 2003 to 2007 2003 to 2007 2003 to 2007 2003 to 2007 Nil
HAR Harmony GM Co Ltd 11,284,469,912                   Pre 2003 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil
ITU Intu Properties plc 53,123,282,990                   Pre 2003 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil
INL Investec Ltd 21,078,622,411                   Pre 2003 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil
LBH Liberty Holdings Ltd 34,802,208,557                   Pre 2003 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 2003 to 2013
LON Lonmin plc 30,292,573,743                   Pre 2003 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil
MTN MTN Group Ltd 406,538,975,593                 Pre 2003 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil
NTC Netcare Limited 38,412,306,693                   Pre 2003 Nil Nil 2004 2011 & 2013 2003, 2004, 2011 & 2013 Nil
OCE Oceana Group Ltd 9,801,144,874                     Pre 2003 Nil 2012 to 2013 2004, 2005, 2012 & 2013 2012 & 2013 2008, 2010 to 2013 Nil
PPC PPC Limited 19,008,920,947                   Pre 2003 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil
RES Resilient Prop Inc Fund 16,280,318,385                   Pre 2003 Nil 2003 & 2004 2003 to 2010 2007 to 2013 2003 to 2006 & 2011 to 2013 Nil
RMH RMB Holdings Ltd 68,255,850,590                   Pre 2003 Nil 2003 2003 2003 2003 Nil
SUI Sun International Ltd 10,876,537,062                   Pre 2003 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil
TRE Trencor Ltd 12,217,692,759                   Pre 2003 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil
Options
Data Control Sheet
TSRAlpha Long Name MarketCap Listed CGI Basic ST Bonus Other
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 
No. Long Name Market Cap
1 Adcock Ingram Hldgs Ltd 12,448,455,243         
2 African Bank Inv Ltd 18,088,173,422         
3 Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 49,489,915,065         
4 Attacq Limited 11,157,819,693         
5 Barloworld Ltd 23,112,936,763         
6 Brait SE 26,934,897,529         
7 British American Tob plc 1,135,076,441,133    
8 Capital Property Fund 17,114,403,871         
9 Capital&Counties Prop plc 42,821,230,220         
10 Compagnie Fin Richemont 545,907,600,000       
11 Discovery Ltd 50,013,216,955         
12 Exxaro Resources Ltd 52,449,596,862         
13 Famous Brands Ltd 9,503,455,576           
14 Glencore Xstrata plc 727,789,403,591       
15 Growthpoint Prop Ltd 47,005,234,789         
16 Illovo Sugar Ltd 12,825,745,377         
17 Imperial Holdings Ltd 42,539,203,800         
18 Investec plc 46,014,435,992         
19 Kumba Iron Ore Ltd 142,829,025,170       
20 Liberty Holdings Ltd 34,802,208,557         
21 Life Healthc Grp Hldgs Ltd 43,626,900,135         
22 MMI Holdings Limited 39,716,033,610         
23 Mondi Ltd 21,260,841,608         
24 Mondi plc 66,540,361,458         
25 Murray & Roberts Hldgs 11,923,375,324         
26 Nampak Ltd 28,620,592,881         
27 Naspers Ltd -N- 455,876,327,282       
28 Nedbank Group Ltd 107,163,502,530       
29 New Europe Prop Inv plc 16,568,083,116         
30 Northam Platinum Ltd 16,068,615,780         
31 Oceana Group Ltd 9,801,144,874           
32 Old Mutual plc 160,572,396,338       
33 Omnia Holdings Ltd 13,581,102,159         
34 Pick N Pay Holdings Ltd 11,863,104,345         
35 Pick n Pay Stores Ltd 24,980,660,692         
36 Pioneer Foods Group Ltd 21,224,459,727         
37 Rand Merchant Ins Hldgs Ltd 40,782,145,098         
38 RCL Foods Limited 10,951,490,690         
39 Redefine International P.L.C 11,829,745,193         
40 Reinet Investments S.C.A 39,560,545,643         
41 Remgro Ltd 99,983,525,813         
42 Resilient Prop Inc Fund 16,280,318,385         
43 Reunert Ltd 13,797,769,023         
44 RMB Holdings Ltd 68,255,850,590         
45 Royal Bafokeng Platinum Ltd 9,798,864,137           
46 SABMiller plc 890,266,923,303       
47 Sanlam Limited 111,804,000,000       
48 Santam Limited 22,231,850,559         
49 Sasol Limited 334,337,028,732       
50 Shoprite Holdings Ltd 93,575,031,440         
51 Standard Bank Group Ltd 209,381,387,046       
52 Steinhoff Int Hldgs Ltd 91,793,716,017         
53 Telkom SA SOC Ltd 14,581,949,144         
54 The Foschini Group Limited 21,256,983,921         
55 The Spar Group Ltd 22,772,262,809         
56 Tiger Brands Ltd 51,129,765,633         
57 Tongaat Hulett Ltd 12,353,243,490         
58 Truworths Int Ltd 35,695,143,987         
59 Tsogo Sun Holdings Ltd 31,461,575,281         
60 Vodacom Group Ltd 197,897,882,000       
61 Wilson Bayly Hlm-Ovc Ltd 9,636,000,000           
62 Woolworths Holdings Ltd 63,228,921,384         
Listed 2009
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Listed 2005
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Listed 2010
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Listed 2011
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Used Redefine Ltd annual reports
Listed 2009
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Listed 2008
Used Investec Ltd annual reports
Listed 2006
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Listed 2010
Listed 2010
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Listed 2006
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Listed 2011
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Listed 2010
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Reason for exclusion from sample
Listed 2008
Liquidated, not all annual reports available
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
Listed 2006
Annual reports do not reflect complete information
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APPENDIX 3 
 
 
 
No. Description 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 Totals Ave.
Board Composition
1 Chairman is independent non-ex ecutiv e director = 1, otherw ise = 0 1        1         1        1          1           1         1        1          1          1        
2 The board should comprise a balance of power, w ith a majority  of non-ex ecutiv e directors = 1, otherw ise = 0 1        1         1        1          1           1         1        1          1          1        
3 The majority  of non-ex ecutiv e directors should be independent = 1, otherw ise = 0 1        1         1        1          1           1         1        1          1          1        
Ownership
4 Institutional/Other shareholding more than 10% (total of institutional more than 5%) 1        1         1        1          1           1         1        1          1          1        
4        4         4        4          4           4         4        4          4          4        40       40%
No. Description 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 Totals (10Y) Ave.  Ave. Growth
1 Basic remuneration 2,945  3,250   3,002  2,806    2,553     2,124   2,652  2,472    2,244    1,920  1,467   25,968         2,597           77.01%
% annual v ariance -9.38% 8.26% 6.99% 9.91% 20.20% -19.91% 7.28% 10.16% 16.88% 30.88% 8.13%
2 Short term incentiv es 2,968  3,124   3,736  2,708    -           1,475   3,732  2,650    1,259    1,511  936     23,163         2,316           147.47%
% annual v ariance 0.00% -16.38% 37.96% 100.00% -100.00% -60.48% 40.83% 110.48% -16.68% 61.43% 15.72%
3 Other (fringe benefits) 1,015  893      840     802      741       622      1,315  1,087    881      431     376     8,627           863              129.44%
% annual v ariance 13.66% 6.31% 4.74% 8.23% 19.13% -52.70% 20.98% 23.38% 104.41% 14.63% 16.28%
4 Total remuneration: 6,928  7,267   7,578  6,316    3,294     4,221   7,699  6,209    4,384    3,862  2,779   57,758         5,776           107.84%
% annual v ariance -4.66% -4.10% 19.98% 91.74% -21.96% -45.17% 24.00% 41.63% 13.52% 38.97% 15.39%
No. Description 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003
1 Share price movement 12500 7980 8264 8250 6200 5100 7900 6825 5300 3900 3400 91.00           
2 Div idends paid 315 263 257 205 90 231 213 205 175 138 20.92           
Total (Share price plus div idend) 12815 8243 8521 8455 6290 5331 8113 7030 5475 4038 3400 111.92         329.18%
TSR per y ear 60.59% -0.25% 3.28% 36.37% 23.33% -32.52% 18.87% 32.64% 40.38% 18.76%
Company: Corporate Governance Index 2004 to 2013
Company: CEO Compensation 2003 to 2013
Company: TSR 2003 to 2013
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APPENDIX 4 
 
 
Companies 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean Mean % CGI Rank
AECI Limited 4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4.00           100.00% 1
African Rainbow Min Ltd 3                3                3                3                3                3                3                3                3                3                3.00           75.00% 24
Anglo American Plat Ltd 2                2                2                2                2                3                2                3                3                3                2.40           60.00% 36
Anglo American plc 3                3                3                3                3                3                3                3                3                3                3.00           75.00% 24
ArcelorMittal SA Limited 3                4                3                3                3                3                3                4                4                4                3.40           85.00% 18
Aspen Pharmacare Hldgs Ltd 2                2                3                3                2                3                3                2                2                3                2.50           62.50% 35
Assore Ltd 1                1                1                1                1                2                2                2                2                2                1.50           37.50% 38
Aveng Group Limited 4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4.00           100.00% 1
AVI Ltd 4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4.00           100.00% 1
Barclays Africa Grp Ltd 4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4.00           100.00% 1
BHP Billiton plc 4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4.00           100.00% 1
Bidvest Ltd 2                2                2                2                3                3                3                3                3                4                2.70           67.50% 30
Capitec Bank Hldgs Ltd 3                2                3                3                3                3                2                2                2                3                2.60           65.00% 32
Clicks Group Ltd 4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4.00           100.00% 1
Coronation Fund Mngrs Ld 3                3                3                2                4                4                4                4                4                4                3.50           87.50% 17
Datatec Ltd 4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4.00           100.00% 1
Distell Group Ltd 4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4.00           100.00% 1
Firstrand Ltd 3                3                3                3                3                3                3                3                3                3                3.00           75.00% 24
Gold Fields Ltd 4                4                4                4                4                4                4                3                3                4                3.80           95.00% 14
Grindrod 3                3                3                3                3                3                3                3                3                2                2.90           72.50% 28
Harmony GM Co Ltd 3                3                3                3                3                3                3                3                3                3                3.00           75.00% 24
Hosken Cons Inv Ltd 2                2                2                2                3                3                3                3                3                3                2.60           65.00% 32
Hyprop Inv Ltd 3                3                3                3                3                4                3                3                3                4                3.20           80.00% 21
Impala Platinum Hlgs Ltd 4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4.00           100.00% 1
Intu Properties plc 3                3                3                2                1                3                2                3                2                2                2.40           60.00% 36
Investec Ltd 3                3                3                3                3                3                3                3                4                4                3.20           80.00% 21
Lonmin plc 2                3                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                3.70           92.50% 16
Massmart Holdings Ltd 3                3                3                3                3                3                3                4                4                4                3.30           82.50% 20
Mediclinic Internat  Ltd 3                3                3                3                2                3                2                2                2                3                2.60           65.00% 32
Mr Price Group Ltd 4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4.00           100.00% 1
MTN Group Ltd 4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                3                3.90           97.50% 13
Netcare Limited 4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4.00           100.00% 1
PPC Limited 2                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                3.80           95.00% 14
PSG Group Ltd 3                3                3                3                3                3                3                2                3                1                2.70           67.50% 30
Redefine Properties Ltd 4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4                4.00           100.00% 1
Sappi Ltd 3                3                3                4                4                4                4                3                3                3                3.40           85.00% 18
Sun International Ltd 3                3                3                4                3                3                3                3                3                3                3.10           77.50% 23
Trencor Ltd 3                3                3                3                3                2                3                3                3                3                2.90           72.50% 28
Mean per year 3.16           3.24           3.29           3.29           3.29           3.45           3.34           3.34           3.37           3.42           
Mean % 78.95% 80.92% 82.24% 82.24% 82.24% 86.18% 83.55% 83.55% 84.21% 85.53%
Mean annual % change 0.00% 2.50% 1.63% 0.00% 0.00% 4.80% -3.05% 0.00% 0.79% 1.56%
Ranked per year 1                2                5                5                5                10              7                7                8                9                
Corporate Governance Index (CGI): Period 2004 to 2013
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APPENDIX 5 
 
 
Companies 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean CGI Rank
AECI Limited 38.97% 13.52% 41.63% 24.00% -45.17% -21.96% 91.74% 19.98% -4.10% -4.66% 15.39% 1
African Rainbow Min Ltd -6.21% -42.72% -5.22% 93.46% 54.61% -22.32% 73.68% -12.68% -6.03% 24.89% 15.15% 24
Anglo American Plat Ltd 3.95% -0.60% 31.48% 207.14% -29.33% -42.00% 14.51% 24.26% 65.28% -37.61% 23.71% 36
Anglo American plc 8.43% -0.52% 24.28% 39.71% -41.24% 3.32% -2.84% 38.21% 10.03% 35.28% 11.47% 24
ArcelorMittal SA Limited 8.25% 77.20% -42.87% 69.02% 44.62% -1.60% -15.14% 52.54% -24.29% 1.18% 16.89% 18
Aspen Pharmacare Hldgs Ltd 54.96% 48.83% 14.75% 1.03% 12.97% 16.29% 16.81% 6.00% 11.34% 5.73% 18.87% 35
Assore Ltd 10.98% 69.05% 25.19% 45.32% 68.98% 1.58% -0.32% 14.02% 14.15% -1.26% 24.77% 38
Aveng Group Limited -14.20% 30.30% 46.86% 20.84% 50.00% -51.93% 18.54% -4.21% 12.68% -4.68% 10.42% 1
AVI Ltd 18.41% -1.17% 27.59% 7.62% 40.58% -2.55% 28.97% 27.19% 10.04% 1.12% 15.78% 1
Barclays Africa Grp Ltd 23.65% 3.57% 55.45% 7.28% -3.31% -55.21% 36.62% -40.07% 0.01% 132.19% 16.02% 1
BHP Billiton plc -13.16% 120.52% -30.50% -50.01% 70.32% 8.70% 14.27% 2.76% -40.89% 115.73% 19.77% 1
Bidvest Ltd 32.96% 83.79% 10.41% 17.66% 14.54% -5.34% 20.07% 22.87% 23.10% -2.19% 21.79% 30
Capitec Bank Hldgs Ltd 30.25% 40.29% 340.98% -51.03% 9.59% 2.40% 76.16% 24.76% -5.76% 2.66% 47.03% 32
Clicks Group Ltd 77.99% 1.27% -70.35% 184.78% 11.59% 43.55% 185.69% -4.59% -24.69% 14.52% 41.98% 1
Coronation Fund Mngrs Ld 313.06% -34.28% 47.57% 13.81% -26.01% 58.25% 30.04% 52.80% -7.17% -20.96% 42.71% 17
Datatec Ltd 41.17% 36.58% 30.09% -4.42% 14.14% -25.40% 67.45% 15.37% -4.70% -34.58% 13.57% 1
Distell Group Ltd 15.88% 11.48% 30.11% 18.02% 10.54% -9.97% 1.66% 16.26% 6.58% 49.31% 14.99% 1
Firstrand Ltd 9.31% 7.40% 27.68% 30.83% -18.56% -20.92% 10.30% 29.39% 12.95% 13.57% 10.19% 24
Gold Fields Ltd 5.86% 0.78% 19.17% 12.10% 73.67% -18.15% 23.07% 126.40% -39.01% -40.28% 16.36% 14
Grindrod -18.83% 84.72% -4.35% -25.37% 25.64% 17.24% -42.55% 169.06% 27.53% 3.27% 23.64% 28
Harmony GM Co Ltd 3.60% -58.02% 13.74% 52.80% 83.28% -0.37% -1.14% 20.82% -8.48% 26.64% 13.29% 24
Hosken Cons Inv Ltd 54.40% 15.16% 4.64% 78.25% -26.48% -13.00% 62.09% 1.97% 8.94% 19.20% 20.52% 32
Hyprop Inv Ltd 26.32% 47.25% 13.41% 15.77% 12.07% -41.19% 62.20% 232.62% -41.81% -67.79% 25.88% 21
Impala Platinum Hlgs Ltd 3.93% 24.50% 26.17% -31.20% 32.04% 59.88% -5.76% 2.31% 14.76% -42.54% 8.41% 1
Intu Properties plc 8.36% -27.69% 43.03% -0.39% -8.72% 62.42% -41.11% 32.53% 8.19% 32.26% 10.89% 36
Investec Ltd 68.10% 43.59% 58.21% 55.08% -3.99% -49.67% -15.66% 22.50% -73.76% 66.67% 17.11% 21
Lonmin plc 159.36% 18.84% -25.54% -13.43% 10.29% 1.98% 19.13% -33.46% -23.51% -0.34% 11.33% 16
Massmart Holdings Ltd 8.50% -23.27% 25.01% 140.46% -52.52% -13.84% -18.11% 32.02% -43.93% 33.56% 8.79% 20
Mediclinic Internat Ltd 16.25% 15.38% 97.42% 13.58% -26.29% 34.38% 25.74% 13.21% 9.41% 10.96% 21.00% 32
Mr Price Group Ltd 48.32% -0.37% 167.00% -11.36% -34.15% 31.84% 55.42% -33.18% 26.15% 6.85% 25.65% 1
MTN Group Ltd 17.19% -26.09% 37.63% 15.82% 22.77% -21.36% 93.51% 131.64% -66.54% 22.52% 22.71% 13
Netcare Limited -30.12% 49.05% 139.85% -2.83% 0.98% -1.84% 40.67% 20.62% 0.96% 5.09% 22.24% 1
PPC Limited 15.45% 17.61% 23.15% 84.12% 58.13% 13.92% -21.14% 8.99% 7.03% 48.24% 25.55% 14
PSG Group Ltd -11.49% -2.60% 61.30% 27.69% -3.23% -76.65% 14.55% 57.70% 26.82% 16.00% 11.01% 30
Redefine Properties Ltd 22.22% 10.00% 18.84% 50.83% 21.95% 31.42% 5.52% -21.62% 13.11% -46.16% 10.61% 1
Sappi Ltd -6.48% 17.02% 229.47% -84.11% 17.78% 0.40% -13.67% 111.94% -24.93% -36.61% 21.08% 18
Sun International Ltd 10.61% 40.38% 7.35% -19.34% 16.55% -1.57% -31.50% 26.70% -10.20% 25.31% 6.43% 23
Trencor Ltd 21.53% 6.86% 2.43% 14.78% 7.06% -17.33% 65.00% 16.51% 16.55% 12.67% 14.61% 28
Mean annual % change 28.36% 18.88% 41.13% 27.59% 12.25% -3.33% 24.85% 32.21% -3.27% 10.15%
CEO Compensation (CC): Period 2004 to 2103
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APPENDIX 6 
 
 
Companies 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean CGI Rank
AECI Limited 18.76% 40.38% 32.64% 18.87% -32.52% 23.33% 36.37% 3.28% -0.25% 60.59% 20.15% 1
African Rainbow Min Ltd -15.00% -0.03% 41.95% 159.05% 129.98% -52.98% 25.79% 19.58% -9.41% -6.72% 29.22% 24
Anglo American Plat Ltd -26.47% 126.47% 98.91% 24.07% -45.29% 53.11% -11.55% -22.35% -16.10% -11.74% 16.91% 36
Anglo American plc -3.70% 65.79% 65.72% 24.06% -48.38% 51.42% 8.84% -12.11% -9.81% -8.32% 13.35% 24
ArcelorMittal SA Limited 141.32% -0.69% 66.07% 57.80% -30.02% 16.45% -21.63% -12.74% -47.51% 3.61% 17.27% 18
Aspen Pharmacare Hldgs Ltd 67.74% 91.18% 55.97% 3.29% -14.05% 72.17% 40.27% 11.76% 51.69% 81.68% 46.17% 35
Assore Ltd -20.19% 76.56% 10.18% 127.92% 200.93% -37.48% 47.25% 62.36% 38.65% 9.07% 51.52% 38
Aveng Group Limited -14.32% 70.00% 76.76% 136.83% 21.92% -37.16% 2.57% 8.13% 1.68% -16.48% 24.99% 1
AVI Ltd 23.93% 39.06% 8.56% 53.55% -30.24% 38.07% 35.88% 50.23% 72.53% 24.10% 31.57% 1
Barclays Africa Grp Ltd 65.57% 43.08% 28.54% -6.79% 2.79% 22.93% 12.49% 5.60% 21.16% -10.04% 18.53% 1
BHP Billiton plc 39.62% 61.76% 65.45% 43.00% 54.80% -38.49% 18.50% 35.53% -7.99% 12.96% 28.51% 1
Bidvest Ltd 28.44% 44.72% 41.73% 50.34% -29.77% 2.20% 30.46% 27.41% 25.59% 38.54% 25.97% 30
Capitec Bank Hldgs Ltd 130.77% 162.07% 111.41% 21.74% 8.11% -19.46% 180.24% 97.45% 19.02% 4.72% 71.61% 32
Clicks Group Ltd 21.05% 9.05% 31.88% 52.00% 5.65% 36.39% 89.96% 14.53% 41.53% -1.72% 30.03% 1
Coronation Fund Mngrs Ld 32.98% 74.57% 18.73% 55.67% -28.37% 42.61% 108.57% 46.86% 65.30% 134.71% 55.16% 17
Datatec Ltd 196.00% -35.20% 132.53% 55.91% -2.08% -58.38% 157.24% 19.19% 29.50% 11.64% 50.64% 1
Distell Group Ltd 33.08% 81.53% 55.88% 43.87% -10.78% 25.27% 23.75% 13.07% 30.01% 39.20% 33.49% 1
Firstrand Ltd 39.40% 41.52% 26.60% 47.85% -37.50% 9.92% 33.93% 34.27% 38.09% 14.78% 24.89% 24
Gold Fields Ltd -26.19% 17.75% 114.57% -31.33% -7.36% -4.90% 31.74% 6.05% -3.96% -68.09% 2.83% 14
Grindrod 246.64% 67.97% 27.53% 55.13% -28.86% 20.13% 9.62% -24.56% 15.56% 79.19% 46.83% 28
Harmony GM Co Ltd -33.05% -10.73% 95.88% -12.12% -5.26% -15.26% 2.38% 11.24% -13.95% -52.61% -3.35% 24
Hosken Cons Inv Ltd -1.69% 755.71% 37.93% 52.13% 28.58% -47.78% 95.47% 0.95% 5.01% 40.26% 96.66% 32
Hyprop Inv Ltd 55.49% 61.01% 36.29% 23.90% 0.18% 16.98% 32.10% 0.16% 44.77% 12.68% 28.36% 21
Impala Platinum Hlgs Ltd 15.84% 38.76% 136.24% 42.10% 54.46% -41.57% 12.44% 9.08% -20.21% -23.46% 22.37% 1
Intu Properties plc 35.67% 5.32% 80.15% -19.93% -51.87% 9.15% -25.62% -5.98% 30.57% 17.51% 7.50% 36
Investec Ltd 72.93% 47.87% 81.87% 54.11% -34.57% -28.96% 65.67% -12.43% -6.44% 41.69% 28.17% 21
Lonmin plc 26.76% 16.33% 159.34% 37.01% -37.03% -36.10% -6.01% -29.10% -43.15% -30.27% 5.78% 16
Massmart Holdings Ltd 63.29% 42.51% 9.67% 90.43% -24.03% 35.92% 52.33% 21.75% 43.46% -29.76% 30.55% 20
Mediclinic Internat Ltd 65.33% 31.25% 64.71% 24.17% -19.08% 12.62% 28.98% 10.11% 32.00% 73.49% 32.36% 32
Mr Price Group Ltd 80.43% 51.57% 93.97% 43.97% -35.03% 40.55% 71.26% 60.23% 59.15% 28.23% 49.43% 1
MTN Group Ltd 178.55% 93.16% 38.70% 51.72% -13.86% 10.43% 18.25% 12.50% 29.30% 28.02% 44.68% 13
Netcare Limited 25.37% 37.37% 93.44% -1.29% -28.16% 30.30% 37.95% -1.88% 41.46% 37.85% 27.24% 1
PPC Limited 79.91% 71.27% 27.11% 45.03% -29.92% 14.88% -0.56% -23.19% 31.01% 9.52% 22.51% 14
PSG Group Ltd 16.81% 93.51% 233.36% 26.21% -20.67% -17.84% 55.31% 98.96% 10.69% 32.70% 52.90% 30
Redefine Properties Ltd 35.65% 70.29% 34.70% 43.86% 0.90% 13.85% 18.72% 12.39% 23.37% 2.57% 25.63% 1
Sappi Ltd 1.58% -16.22% 36.99% 6.41% -21.88% -64.63% 26.78% -33.53% -0.80% 6.72% -5.86% 18
Sun International Ltd 43.32% 57.65% 39.85% 79.79% -42.80% -13.25% 9.38% 13.45% 0.16% 9.97% 19.75% 23
Trencor Ltd 43.43% 47.48% 47.95% -5.57% -26.07% 40.05% 27.24% 24.22% 59.26% 30.18% 28.82% 28
Mean annual % change 46.98% 67.68% 64.73% 41.44% -5.98% 3.28% 36.38% 14.54% 17.92% 16.50%
Total shareholder returns (TSR): Period 2004 to 2013
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APPENDIX 7 
 
 
TSR ALSI
2004 46.98% 25.44%
2005 67.68% 47.25%
2006 64.73% 41.23%
2007 41.44% 19.19%
2008 -5.98% -23.23%
2009 3.28% 32.13%
2010 36.38% 18.98%
2011 14.54% 2.57%
2012 17.92% 26.68%
2013 16.50% 21.43%
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics Interpretation
Multiple R 0.719387662 Strong positive
R Square 0.517518608 Moderate
Adj. R Square 0.457208433
Standard Error 0.146897685
Observations 10
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.185167725 0.185167725 8.580950322 0.019017761
Residual 8 0.172631439 0.02157893
Total 9 0.357799164
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.038113292 0.075290209 0.506218435 0.626355778 -0.135506241 0.211732825 -0.135506241 0.211732825
TSR 0.571967409 0.195255641 2.929325916 0.019017761 0.121707094 1.022227724 0.121707094 1.022227724
TSR and ALSI Relationship. Results Statistical Analysis - Simple Linear Regression TSR (x variable) ALSI (y variable)
Interpretation
p-value < 0.05 therefore reject H0
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